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Cognitive biases, such as TAF, play a crucial role in the cognitive-behavioral model of 
anxiety disorders and have been shown to prospectively increase the risk of developing 
future psychopathology.  However, little research has examined the risk factors for this 
theoretically important construct. Therefore, the current study examined the 
developmental correlates of TAF using a multi-method approach.  Using both a self-
report (N =407) and in vivo measure of TAF (N = 107), results indicated that religious-
related variables predicted the moral bias of TAF, whereas parenting strategies and 
childhood trauma were associated with the likelihood bias.  Distinct mediation pathways 
were observed, with intrinsic motivation mediating the relationship between religiosity 
and the moral bias; and psychological control mediating the relationship between 
childhood traumas and the likelihood bias.  Despite these effects, comprehensive models 
predicting both biases were severely misfit.  Results suggest that unique developmental 
correlates are associated with the moral and likelihood biases, and given the amount of 
variance unexplained by our models, other biological, psychosocial, and cultural 
variables need to be evaluated. Our findings are discussed in terms of developmental 
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Developmental Experiences in the Prediction of Thought Action Fusion: 
Contribution of Religious, Familial, and Stress Factors 
 
The role of dysfunctional beliefs in the cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety and 
mood disorders is widely accepted.  Cognitive theories, most notably Beck’s cognitive 
specificity theory (1976), argue that emotional disorders develop from the 
misinterpretation of stimuli and events. In social phobia, one might misinterpret an 
external stimulus (e.g., crowd’s laughter) and assume to be the target of negative 
evaluation (Clark & Wells, 1995). In obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), it is 
common to misinterpret normal intrusive thoughts and overestimate their significance or 
dangerousness (Rachman, 1997, 1998; Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis, 1985). 
Rachman (1998), for example, proposed that when one perceives a normally occurring 
intrusive thought (e.g., an unacceptable violent image) as highly significant (e.g., 
“Having this thought means its important”) or dangerous and threatening (e.g., "Thinking 
this thought means I'm immoral"), it leads to anxiety and a preoccupation with the 
unwanted thought.   
Longitudinal research suggests that the presence of certain dysfunctional beliefs 
and cognitive biases (e.g., the belief that thinking of doing something bad is equivalent to 
the corresponding action) prospectively increases the risk of developing future 
psychopathology, such as obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Abramowitz, Khandker, 
Nelson, Deacon, & Rygwall, 2006).  Thus, cognitive biases represent distinct 
psychological diatheses or vulnerabilities and indicate an avenue by which at-risk 
individuals can be identified (Timpano, Abramowitz, Mahaffey, Mitchell, & Schmidt, 
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2011). Given the important role of cognitive biases in the development and maintenance 
of emotional disorders, better understanding factors that contribute to their development 
is critical for designing effective prevention and intervention programs (Kraemer, Stice, 
Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001; Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & 
Freeston, 1999).   
Although a number of cognitive biases have shown a relationship with anxiety 
and mood disorders, the current study will focus upon one cognitive factor, Thought 
Action Fusion (TAF), that has been implicated in Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Hazlett-
Stevens, Zucker, & Craske, 2002), Panic, Social Anxiety, and Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (Rachman & Shafran, 1999; Rassin, Diepstraten, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2001; 
Rassin, Merkelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 2001), and most often, Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder  (Abramowitz, Storch, Keeley, & Cordell, 2007; Rassin, Muris, Schmidt, & 
Merckelbach, 2000; Rassin, Diepstraten, et al., 2001; Rassin, Merkelbach, et al, 2001; 
Rassin & Koster, 2003; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996; Smari & 
Holmsteinsson, 2001; Yorulmaz, Yilmaz, & Gencoz, 2004). TAF involves two biases 
that are thought to underlie the misperception of unwanted thoughts as highly significant 
and threatening (Shafran, et al., 1996).  The moral TAF bias refers to morally equating 
thoughts and actions (e.g., a sexual thought involving one’s mother is as morally 
repugnant as engaging in the sexual behavior).  The likelihood TAF bias refers to the 
belief that thinking about a particular event increases the likelihood of the corresponding 
event occurring (e.g., thinking about my neighbor getting into a car accident increases the 
likelihood that this will occur; Shafran et al., 1996).  The likelihood and moral biases 
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have shown a moderate correlation (r’s =.32 to .44; Rassin, Merkelbach, et al., 2001; 
Shafran et al., 1996), suggesting that they might be unique constructs, yet can co-occur.  
TAF and Psychopathology 
 
 Salkovskis (1985) initially documented the construct of TAF, noting that patients 
with OCD had a tendency to assume that a “thought is like an action” (p. 574).  Later 
researchers investigated the concept and developed a validated measure, the Thought 
Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996).  Contemporary research efforts have 
used the TAFS, as well as in vivo behavioral paradigms, to study TAF as it relates to 
various psychopathological constructs.  
TAF and OCD.  Cognitive-behavioral models of obsessions have implicated 
TAF in some presentations of OCD.  Rachman (1998), for instance, argued that 
interpreting a harmless unwanted thought (e.g., stealing from the grocery store) as 
morally unacceptable (e.g., equivalent to stealing) or as likely to lead to the feared 
outcome (e.g., shoplifting), might result in increased anxiety and an obsessional 
preoccupation with the thought, as well as attempts to suppress the thought or reduce 
anxiety (e.g., compulsive rituals or neutralizing behaviors). Using self-report measures, 
such as the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 
1977), the Padua-Revised (Van Oppen, Hoekstra, & Emmelkamp, 1995), and the Padua 
Inventory –Washington State University Revision (Burns, Keortge, Formea, & 
Sternberger, 1996), a weak to moderate relationship between TAF and OCD symptoms 
has been found (r’s between .20 and .65; Gwilliam, Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; 
Rassin, Diepstraten, et al., 2001; Yorulmaz, Karanci, Bastug, Kısa, & Goka, 2007).  
In addition to self-report questionnaires, investigators have used in vivo measures 
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to assess the relationship between TAF and OCD.  These behavioral paradigms have been 
conceptualized as an analogue for OCD, in that one experiences an intrusive thought, 
which results in increased anxiety and a desire to reduce distress. The first TAF induction 
was conducted by Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, and Teachman (1996), in which 
participants were asked to think of a beloved relative and then write a sentence indicating 
that they hoped the relative would be in a car accident. Results indicated that after 
participants contemplated this negative event, they reported increased levels of distress, 
feelings of responsibility, guilt, and urges to neutralize (i.e., cancel the effects of thinking 
the thought).  Rachman et al. argued that TAF could be inferred from participants’ 
distress and the neutralizing behaviors associated with thinking the negative thought 
about the relative.  Bocci and Gordon (2007) similarly examined participants’ response to 
thinking about a relative being in a car accident (i.e., likelihood TAF).  Participants 
reported an increase in anxiety after writing the sentence, and 75% of participants 
engaged in a neutralizing behavior (e.g., crossing out the relative’s name) following the 
TAF induction. Bocci and Gordon concluded that neutralization was a frequent behavior 
in response to the activation of likelihood TAF beliefs. A number of other researchers 
have also experimentally induced TAF in a nonclinical sample using Rachman et al.’s 
(1996) paradigm, finding elevated ratings of anxiety, likelihood, and urges to neutralize 
following the induction (Berman, Abramowitz, Pardue, Wheaton, 2010; Berman, 
Abramowitz, Wheaton, Pardue, & Fabricant, 2011; Marcks & Woods, 2007; Rassin, 
Merckelbach, Muris, & Spaan, 1999; van den Hout, Kindt, Weiland, & Peters, 2002; van 
den Hout, van Pol, & Peters, 2001; Zucker, Craske, Barrios, & Holguin, 2002).  
TAF and other disorders.  In addition to OCD, TAF has been implicated in a 
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number of other anxiety disorders. Due to the similarity between pathological worry and 
obsessive thoughts, researchers have hypothesized that TAF plays a role in the 
development and maintenance of the meta-cognitive beliefs associated with Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD; Hazlett-Stevens, et al., 2002).  Hazlett-Stevens, et al. (2002) 
found that the scores of individuals with GAD on the TAFS likelihood subscale, but not 
moral subscale, were positively associated with scores on the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).  Given these 
findings, Hazlett-Stevens, et al. suggested that individuals with GAD might overvalue the 
powerfulness of their worries, such that he/she might believe that worrying affects the 
likelihood that a feared outcome will occur (e.g., “If I worry about my mother’s health, 
that will decrease the likelihood of her getting sick”).  
A similar set of TAF-like beliefs regarding the likelihood bias have also been 
studied in relation to social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Rachman & Shafran, 1999; Rassin, Diepstraten, et al., 2001; Rassin, 
Merkelbach, et al, 2001).  In social anxiety disorder, an individual might overvalue the 
powerfulness of his/her thoughts on external events and might believe that having 
judgmental thoughts increases the likelihood of social rejection. In panic disorder, an 
individual might believe that thinking about physiological symptoms that are associated 
with panic attacks (e.g., racing heart, dizziness) will increase the likelihood of the 
symptoms occurring.  Finally, in post-traumatic stress disorder, an individual might be 
fearful that thinking about the traumatic experience increases the likelihood of 
recurrence.  
The TAF-like beliefs that relate to both OCD and other anxiety disorders are 
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similar in their overestimation of likelihood, however, Berle and Starcevic (2005) note 
that the response to the triggering TAF thoughts differs between patients with OCD and 
other anxiety disorders.  Those with OCD tend to respond with neutralizing behaviors 
(e.g., compulsions), whereas those with other anxiety disorders tend to respond with 
avoidance (e.g., avoiding public places where a panic attack might occur).  Although 
behavioral responses to TAF-like thoughts might differ, research suggests that 
individuals with anxiety disorders tend to experience the likelihood TAF bias, when 
compared to nonanxious and depressed individuals (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & 
Kalsy, 2003).  On the other hand, the moral bias might be specifically related to 
depressive concerns, as indicated by small to medium correlations (r’s = .10 to .42) 
between the moral subscale of TAFS and self-report measures of depression 
(Abramowitz et al., 2003; Rassin, Merkelbach, et al, 2001; Shafran et al., 1996).  
Additionally, mediational models have indicated that only the TAFS moral subscale, but 
not the likelihood subscale, is associated with depressive symptoms when measures of 
trait anxiety are controlled for (Abramowitz et al., 2003). It is hypothesized that 
individuals’ tendency to engage in self-blame and personalization, as well as experience 
feelings of excess guilt explains the relationship between the moral bias and depressive 
symptoms (Berle & Starcevic, 2005).  
As is evident from the reviewed literature, TAF-like beliefs occur in a range of 
psychopathological concerns.  The likelihood bias has been associated with various 
anxiety disorders; the moral bias has shown a relationship to depressive symptoms.  
These findings support the cognitive model of emotional disorders and implicate TAF as 
an important cognitive bias. But what, then, contributes to the development of this 
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cognitive bias? To date, very little research has investigated this question. The current 
study, therefore, aims to elucidate religious, familial, and stress-related factors (i.e., 
developmental experiences) in childhood and adolescence that might predict TAF.  
Given the lack of research in this domain, it is informative to draw from 
Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) proposed developmental pathways for OCD-related cognitions 
more broadly.  Salkovskis et al.’s theoretical work can direct the current study’s 
identification of relevant developmental experiences. Of their proposed pathways, two 
are particularly relevant to TAF: (1) exposure to rigid or extreme rules of conduct and 
duty and (2) experiencing a misfortunate negative event (Salkovskis et al., 1999).  These 
two possible “pathways” to TAF are reviewed next. 
Rigid Rules 
Salkovskis et al. (1999) proposed that the imposition of strict behavioral or moral 
principles could contribute to the development of a set of beliefs involving standards for 
thinking and behaving.  Authority figures and institutions, such as parents and certain 
religions, can reinforce these attitudes about the equivalence of thoughts and behaviors 
through guilt, as well as the explicit possibility of worldly or divine retribution for 
thinking “bad” thoughts.  Some religious doctrines, for instance, suggest that having 
certain immoral thoughts is sinful.  Children taught this phenomenon of “sin by thought” 
might feel morally responsible for controlling their own thought processes, leading to 
increased preoccupation with their thinking. Children who internalize the notion that 
negative intrusive thoughts are sinful might also misinterpret those thoughts as dangerous 
or threatening. 
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Although Salkovskis et al. (1999) theorized how a number of factors give rise to 
rigid rules of moral conduct and behavior, no research has investigated how these 
developmental experiences compare to one another in the prediction of TAF. Therefore, 
the following factors that Salkovskis et al. (1999) implicated in the origin of rigid rules 
will be reviewed: type of religion, strength of religiosity, and parenting strategies. I will 
also highlight each construct’s demonstrated or potential relationship to TAF.  
Subsequently, I will present extant research supporting Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) second 
pathway, that negative or traumatic experiences influence TAF.   
Religious affiliation and religiosity.  Before presenting research evaluating the 
relationship between religion and TAF, it is necessary to review: the definition of 
religion, the difficulties inherent in studying the relationship between religion and 
psychopathology, and the methodological approaches commonly taken when assessing 
religion and religiosity.  For the purposes of this study, religion will refer to an 
“organized system of beliefs, rituals, practices, and community, which is oriented toward 
the sacred” (Dew, Daniel, Armstrong, Goldstron, Triplett, & Koenig, 2008, p. 382).  By 
adopting this definition, a religious group is considered distinct if the organization 
espouses a purportedly unique set of belief systems and accompanying ritual practices. 
 The measurement of religiosity, as it relates to TAF (or OCD symptoms more 
generally), has varied considerably across studies. Many researchers have constructed 
self-report indices to assess religiosity, with questions evaluating religious service 
attendance, affiliation, and/or subjective strength of religiosity (Abramowitz, Deacon, 
Woods, & Tolin, 2004; Abramowitz, Huppert, Cohen, Tolin, & Cahill, 2002; 
Abramowitz et al., 2003; Rassin & Koster, 2003; Siev, Chambless, & Huppert, 2010; 
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Steketee, Quay, & White, 1991; Yorulmaz, Gencoz, & Woody, 2009).  Each study’s 
unique and self-constructed measure of religiosity reduces the reliability and 
generalizability of the results, and moreover, it is likely that the measures are not 
thoroughly assessing the complexity of the construct (Shreve-Neiger & Edelstein, 2004).   
Although recent studies in this field (e.g., Berman et al., 2010) have utilized 
validated self-report questionnaires to assess religiosity, other methodological limitations 
limit the external validity of the results.  For instance, Berman et al. (2010) dichotomized 
Protestant participants into “high” and “low” religious categories, which decreases power 
(MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002) and limits the generalizability to other 
religions or samples (Allison, Gorman, & Primavera, 1993). Given the methodological 
and statistical weaknesses present in the various studies that have assessed the 
relationship between religiosity and TAF, it is difficult to generalize their findings.  
Therefore, future studies examining this relationship should use a validated measure of 
religiosity that is frequently employed and consider religiosity to be a continuous variable 
(Marino, Lunt, & Negy, 2008).  
Although previous studies examining the relationship between religiosity and 
TAF have methodological flaws, their findings hold important theoretical implications.  
Using self-report questionnaires, research suggests that certain religious groups have a 
positive association between religiosity and TAF (Abramowitz et al, 2004; Rassin & 
Koster, 2003; Sica, Norvara, & Sanavio, 2002; Siev & Cohen 2007; Siev et al., 2010; 
Yorulmaz et al., 2009). Moreover, this relationship appears to be most pronounced 
among Christians and Muslims (Abramowitz et al., 2004; Rassin & Koster, 2003; Siev & 
Cohen, 2007; Siev et al., 2010; Yorulmaz et al., 2009).  Most recently, Siev et al. (2010) 
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found that after controlling for strength of religiosity, religious Christians (both Catholics 
and Protestants) scored higher than Jews on moral TAF.  Additionally, Siev et al. (2010) 
demonstrated a positive relationship between religiosity and moral TAF in a Christian 
sample.  
In addition to self-report questionnaires, in vivo behavioral paradigms have been 
used to demonstrate religious group differences in TAF.  For instance, Berman et al. 
(2010) asked highly religious Protestants and Atheists/Agnostics to insert their most 
beloved relative into the following two sentences: “I hope ________ gets into a car 
accident today” (likelihood TAF) and “I hope I have sex with ___________” (moral 
TAF). Participants were instructed to contemplate these thoughts, write them down on a 
note card, and then answer a variety of follow-up questions (e.g., anxiety, likelihood of 
event occurring, and moral wrongness of thinking the thought). Results indicated that 
highly religious Protestants, compared to nonreligious participants, more strongly 
believed that thinking about a loved one being in a car accident influenced the likelihood 
of such an accident occurring.  Moreover, the highly religious Protestants believed that it 
was more morally unacceptable to think about and write down the thought about incest.   
Finally, acts to neutralize or “undo” the effects of thinking about and writing down the 
two target thoughts were more common among the religious participants, relative to the 
nonreligious group.  Thus, results from both the self-report and in vivo measures suggest 
that certain religious groups perceive the presence and meaning of negative unwanted 
thoughts to be more personally significant, influential, and immoral.   
It has been hypothesized that religious group differences in TAF are due to 
differences in religious doctrine (Berman et al., 2010; Cohen & Rozin, 2001; Salkovskis 
  11
et al., 1999; Siev & Cohen, 2007; Yorulmaz et al., 2009). In Christianity, instructive 
Bible verses that reference “sin by thought” are considered to be religious directives that 
might promote TAF-like beliefs.  For instance, in Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, he states, 
“I say to you that everyone who looks on a woman to lust for her has committed adultery 
already in his heart” (Matthew 5:27–28; New American Standard Version). This verse 
implies that thinking about something immoral is comparable to engaging in immoral 
behavior (i.e., moral TAF).   
Given that Muslims have also exhibited a relationship with TAF (Yorulmaz et al., 
2004; Yorulmaz et al., 2009), it is important to highlight the elements of Islamic religious 
doctrine that might influence this phenomenon. In Islam, there are strict religious rules 
(e.g., regular prayer) and behaviors (e.g., cleanliness) that must be followed to achieve 
salvation (Ghassemzadeh, Mojtabai, Khamseh, Ebrahimkhani, Issazadegan, & Saif-
Nobakht, 2002).  Moreover, intrusive thoughts and doubts about religious practices 
(termed “vesvese/waswas”) are considered to be evil forces (Al-Issa & Qudji, 1998).  
Thus, in Islam, the control one is expected to maintain over thoughts and the negative 
association related to doubting one’s religion might affect how strongly one perceives the 
moral importance of thoughts (Yorulmaz et al., 2009).  
The reviewed findings for both Christianity and Islam are consistent with 
Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) assertion that religious doctrine, which contains standards for 
the unacceptability of certain thoughts, coupled with the threat of divine punishment for 
disobedience, fosters TAF-like beliefs. Thus, when a devoutly religious individual 
experiences certain negative or otherwise irreverent thoughts, TAF beliefs might be 
activated, leading to an interpretation of the thought as unacceptable and perhaps needing 
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to be neutralized, “undone,” or “dealt with.” However, these results do not suggest that 
religious teachings cause TAF beliefs; it might be that individuals who experience TAF 
are drawn towards certain religions or to strengthen their religiosity (Berle & Starcevic, 
2005; Berman et al., 2010; Rassin & Koster, 2003). Additionally, because not all highly 
religious Christians and Muslims experience TAF-like beliefs that cause clinical distress, 
it might be that more important than one’s religion is an overly rigid interpretation of the 
belief system and disproportionate fear of punishment (Salkovskis et al., 1999). Given 
past research, in the present study, I will examine the hypothesis that religiosity will 
positively predict both the moral and likelihood biases of TAF across all participants 
affiliating with a religion. Additionally, depending on the sample’s variability in religious 
affiliation, I will examine whether religious affiliation moderates the relationship 
between religiosity and TAF, such that individuals affiliating with Christianity and/or 
Islam will possess a stronger relationship between religiosity and TAF.  
While many researchers have demonstrated a relationship between religion and 
TAF, other factors that have not been measured (e.g., motivation for religion, family 
factors) might also contribute to TAF.  Moreover, these unmeasured variables might 
similarly be related to religion and/or religiosity; therefore, when such variables are 
controlled for, the relationship between religion and TAF might weaken (Dew et al., 
2008).  From a treatment perspective, it is critical to ascertain other factors associated 
with TAF in addition to religion, since clinicians cannot refute a patient’s religious 
beliefs as a mode of cognitive restructuring.  However, certain parenting strategies or 
family factors that might influential in TAF can be therapeutically addressed and 
modified.   
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Motivation for religion.  In addition to religious affiliation and degree of 
religiosity, research suggests that one’s motivation for religion can also influence mental 
health outcomes (Luyten, Corveleyn, & Fontaine, 1998).  Allport and Ross (1967) 
initially identified intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as two types of orientations toward 
religion. Individuals with high levels of intrinsic motivation find their “master motive in 
religion” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434), perceive it to be a vital and guiding factor in 
their life, and believe that religion offers a foundational set of appropriate moral and 
personal values. Individuals with high levels of extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, 
are motivated by external forces and perceive religion to be a tool to strengthen one’s 
political status or social relationships.  In essence, an extrinsically motivated person can 
be seen as utilitarian, assessing the importance of his/her religious beliefs based on its 
relationship to an external reward system (Ellison, 2008; Meek, Albright, & McMinn, 
1995).  Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) further deconstructed motivational orientation, 
finding that extrinsic motivation contained two components, social (i.e., religion used to 
gain social status or power) and personal (i.e., religious used to bolster feelings of 
comfort or safety).  Research suggests that when the extrinsic components are combined, 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are independent constructs (Donahue, 1985), possessing 
a weak negative correlation (Ellison, 2008; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Sheldon, 
2006).   
Identifying the role of motivational orientation in the prediction of TAF might 
provide insight into specific elements of religion that influence this cognitive bias.  
However, due to the paucity of research empirically evaluating how motivational 
orientation and cognitive biases are related, generating predictions in this domain is 
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difficult.  It might be that intrinsically motivated individuals internalize religious 
directives, such as “sin by thought”, more strongly, therefore contributing to greater 
TAF-like beliefs. Extrinsic individuals, on the other hand, might not internalize religious 
doctrine to the same extent since their religiosity is motivated by social, personal, and 
political factors.  In the present study, I will examine the hypotheses that intrinsic, but not 
extrinsic motivation for religion, will predict both the moral and likelihood subscale of 
TAF and that intrinsic motivation will mediate the relationship between religiosity and 
both TAF biases in Protestants and Catholics.  
Guilt induction.  Salkovskis et al. (1999) also proposed that family factors, such 
as parenting, influence the development of rigid rules.  Certain parenting strategies, such 
as guilt induction, might contribute to a child’s understanding of which thoughts and 
feelings are appropriate or moral and which are not.  Similar to motivational orientation, 
parental guilt induction might account for variance in TAF that has been attributed to 
religiosity in previous research.  In order to demonstrate how this construct potentially 
influences TAF, I will (1) define the construct of guilt, (2) discuss the relationship 
between guilt and religiosity, (3) describe how parenting practices can influence guilt, 
and (4) relate research on guilt induction to TAF. 
Guilt can be defined as remorse in response to the perceived violation of a moral 
principle (Klass, 1987). Thus, to experience guilt, one must be aware of a moral law and 
subjectively measure one’s thoughts and behaviors against this standard (Faiver, O’Brien, 
& Ingersoll, 2000).  But how do children come to understand these moral laws? 
Albertsen, O’Connor, and Berry (2006) argue that these moral principles are culturally 
transmitted.  Two likely avenues of transmission are religion and parenting.  
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For some, religious beliefs are influential in the formation of moral principles 
(Ellis, 1980). Research has demonstrated positive correlations between religiosity and 
general guilt, guilt related to immoral thoughts, and shame-free guilt (Luyten, et al., 
1998; Fehr & Stamps, 1979; Albertsen, et al., 2006, respectively). Although, religiosity 
does not fully explain one’s tendency to feel and experience guilt (Luyten et al., 1998), 
suggesting that other factors (e.g., parenting) are influential in children’s understanding 
of moral principles and their violation (Albertsen, et al., 2006). Parents might rely upon 
maladaptive guilt-inducing tactics to mold children’s moral fiber and their understanding 
of social expectations within and outside of the family system. As a result, guilt induction 
might mimic the effect of religiosity on TAF.  
Two forms of parental guilt-induction have been identified (Donatelli, Bybee, & 
Buka, 2007): self-serving elicitation, in which the parent over-emphasizes the sacrifices 
he/she has made for the child while simultaneously limiting the child’s autonomy; and 
disparagement, in which the parent perseverates over the child’s previous and minor 
transgressions and inappropriately places blames on the child when he/she was not at 
fault (Donatelli et al., 2007).   Research suggests that chronic exposure to high levels of 
parental guilt induction interferes with the child’s autonomy, emotional and social 
growth, and management of interpersonal conflicts (Rakow, Forehand, McKee, Coffelt, 
Champion, Fear, et al., 2009).  Consequently, parental guilt induction has been associated 
with the development of childhood internalizing symptoms, even when traditional 
parenting factors (e.g., warmth/involvement, monitoring, and discipline) were accounted 
for (Donatelli et al., 2007; Rakow et al., 2009; Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, Krupnick, & 
McKnew, 1990).  
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Children’s problem solving abilities might explain the development of 
internalizing symptoms as a result of parental guilt induction (Rakow et al., 2009).  At a 
young age, if unwarranted blame and responsibility are placed upon the child, he/she 
might not possess the cognitive capabilities to differentiate between problems that he/she 
has caused from problems that were a result of forces beyond his/her control (Rakow et 
al., 2009). Consequently, in difficult to control situations, the child might bear the onus of 
blame and ruminate over his/her role in the outcome (Bybee, Zigler, Berliner, & Merisca, 
1996).  Rakow et al. (2009) argued that despite improved problem solving capabilities, 
acceptance of blame can continue into adolescent years.  
Clear similarities can be drawn between TAF and the consequential effects of 
guilt induction.  Parental guilt induction leads to, and TAF involves, a misappropriation 
of one’s role in external events that are beyond his/her control (likelihood TAF) and an 
overvaluation of the moral wrongness associated with certain thoughts, wishes, or beliefs 
(moral TAF).  Additionally, parental guilt induction has demonstrated a positive 
relationship with childhood internalizing symptoms (Donatelli et al., 2007; Rakow et al., 
2009) and TAF has been implicated in the development and maintenance of anxiety and 
mood problems (e.g., Hazlett-Stevens, et al., 2002; Rachman, 1998; Rachman & Shafran, 
1999).   
No research has yet examined how parental guilt induction and TAF are related.  
Rather, investigators have only examined how guilt can be a product of TAF. For 
instance, Rachman et al. (1996) demonstrated that feelings of guilt increased following an 
induction of a personally relevant TAF belief.  Results indicated, not surprisingly, that 
misinterpreting one’s role in the occurrence of a catastrophic event led to heightened 
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feelings of guilt.  Given the reviewed research, the current study hypothesizes that 
parental guilt induction will predict both the moral and likelihood biases of TAF, and that 
this parenting strategy will mediate the previously documented relationship between 
religiosity and TAF.   
Psychological control.  Parental psychological control – attempts to control a 
child’s psychological and emotional development by intruding upon and limiting the 
child’s thinking processes, emotional expression, autonomy, and attachment (Barber, 
1996) – is a parenting strategy that promotes rigid rules of conduct and duty.  Therefore, 
it seems that developmental experiences with psychological control are consistent with 
Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) “rigid rules” pathway. A critical element of psychological 
control is the parents’ management of children’s mental processes (e.g., thoughts and 
emotions).  For instance, if a child yells, “My sister is so annoying! I wish she would just 
die,” the psychologically controlling parent responds by telling him that he “should never 
think or wish such terrible things!”  Research suggests that mothers, as compared to 
fathers, employ psychological control more often (Barber, 1996; Barber & Harmon, 
2002), but that adolescent’s perceive both parents to engage in this parenting strategy at 
comparable rates (Rogers, Buchanan, & Winchell, 2003).  However, Barber, Stolz, and 
Olsen (2005) documented that in a longitudinal cross-national study, no gender 
differences in psychological control were found in parents or children. Barber et al. 
(2005) argued that the absence of gender differentiation highlights the universal effect of 
parents’ emotionally intrusive behaviors.  
 Empirical evidence indicates that psychological control is distinct from behavioral 
control (i.e., parents attempt to manage and control children’s overt behaviors; Rogers, et 
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al., 2003). However, research has demonstrated that both psychological and behavioral 
control significantly predict youth problem behaviors (Albrecht, Galambos, & Jansson, 
2007; Barber, 1996; Barber, Stolz, & Olsen, 2005; Rogers, et al., 2003), with 
psychological control possessing a unique relationship with internalizing symptoms 
(Albrecht et al., 2007; Barber, 1996; Barber, et al., 2005; Petit, Laird, Dodge, Bates, & 
Criss, 2001; Rogers et al., 2003).  Moreover, the relationship between psychological 
control and adolescents’ psychosocial development has been consistently demonstrated in 
various cultures and socioeconomic statuses (Barber, et al., 2005).   
Based upon the reviewed literature, the maladaptive effect of parental 
psychological control on children’s thinking processes and autonomy seeking is a 
possible contributor to TAF-like beliefs.  If children are made to feel dependent on their 
parents for management of their thoughts and emotions, they might not develop 
appropriate skills to independently discern their role in the occurrence of external events 
or differentiate moral from immoral thoughts.  Moreover, psychologically controlling 
parents might exert control (e.g., “thinking is as bad as doing”) over their children’s 
moral processes, thereby shaping children’s perception of the moral wrongness of certain 
thoughts.  
Unlike parental guilt induction, little research has examined the relationship 
between religion and parental psychological control. This is surprising given the potential 
overlap between psychological control and certain religious directives to control one’s 
thoughts and resultant emotions and behaviors. Barber’s (1996) study incorporated 
religion into analyses and demonstrated that Mormon youth reported less parental 
psychological control than non-Mormon youth.  Given the absence of extensive empirical 
  19
research examining the relationship between religious affiliation, religiosity, and parental 
psychological control, it might be that psychological control accounts for variance in 
TAF that had previously been accounted for by religiosity.  Thus, the current study 
hypothesizes that psychological control will predict both the moral and likelihood biases 
of TAF and mediate the relationship between religiosity and TAF. 
An important caveat is that some research suggests that parental guilt induction is 
a component of psychological control (Barber & Harmon, 2002), thus, it will be 
important to critically evaluate the relationship between these two parenting strategies to 
ensure that unique constructs are being considered in the prediction of TAF.  It is also 
important to note that both parental guilt induction and psychological control are factors 
of parenting styles and are not, in and of themselves, parenting typologies, such as those 
studied by Baumrind (1967).  Research has demonstrated that elements of parenting style 
predict psychopathology outcomes over and above traditional parenting typology 
measures (Donatelli et al., 2007; Rakow, 2009; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1990).  Moreover, 
Barber (1996) highlights the need to disaggregate parenting typologies in order to show 
how specific components of parenting (e.g., guilt induction) relate to both positive and 
negative outcomes.  Thus, in the current study, no measure of parenting typologies was 
included.  
Negative Life Events 
 
 Salkovskis et al. (1999) argued that in addition to developmental factors 
associated with rigid rules (e.g., religion, parental guilt induction, and psychological 
control), negative life events (e.g., childhood trauma) could influence TAF.  Research 
suggests that in children, traumas disrupt cognitive development and might result in 
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cognitive distortions pertaining to oneself, others, the environment, and the future (self-
trauma model; Briere, 1996).  More specifically, Briere (1996) reported that three types 
of cognitive distortions are associated with childhood trauma: (1) safety (e.g., 
preoccupied by the prospect of danger) (2) controllability (e.g., perceived helplessness) 
and (3) internal attribution (e.g., self-blame). These cognitive distortions are then 
maintained by attending to internal and external cues that support the maladaptive beliefs 
(Browne & Winkelman, 2007). The development and maintenance of cognitive 
distortions following childhood trauma might explain the increased prevalence rate of 
internalizing disorders following early life stress (Heim & Nemeroff, 2001).  As can be 
seen, the cognitive distortions associated with childhood trauma overlap with the biases 
associated with TAF (e.g., responsibility over external events and being preoccupied by 
the likelihood of danger).  Thus, the current study hypothesizes that childhood trauma 
will predict one’s experience of moral- and likelihood-TAF.  
Present Study 
Given the limited research examining developmental experiences associated with 
cognitive biases, the current study aims to evaluate how theoretically relevant religious, 
familial, and stress-related factors predict TAF beliefs.  After reviewing previous 
research, six factors emerged as potential predictors of TAF: (1) religious affiliation, (2) 
strength of religiosity, (3) motivational orientation toward religion (i.e., intrinsic and 
extrinsic), (4) parental guilt induction, (5) parental psychological control, and (6) 
childhood trauma. The chosen constructs are meant to assess possible pathways 
associated with the development of cognitive biases (Salkovskis et al., 1999). In addition 
to assessing Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) developmental pathways, intrinsic motivation, 
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parental guilt induction, and parental psychological control might mediate the 
consistently demonstrated relationship between religiosity and TAF.  Understanding 
other factors, besides religion, that influence TAF can assist clinicians in developing 
prevention programs that target therapeutically appropriate topics, such as parenting 
strategies. In doing so, possible developmental factors could be addressed early in life 
(i.e., prior to the development of TAF beliefs).  
In order to examine how these various factors predict TAF, the current study 
employs a multi-method approach with a non-treatment seeking undergraduate sample.  
A student sample is appropriate for this study since TAF is not a clinical symptom per se, 
but rather a vulnerability factor that occurs along a continuum and is widely distributed in 
the general population (e.g., Beck, 1976; Rassin, Merkelbach, et al, 2001; Shafran et al., 
1996). Moreover, given ample research suggesting that increased stress can lead to the 
development of cognitive biases and subsequent psychopathology (Finlay-Jones & 
Brown, 1981; Maina, Albert, Bogetto, Vaschetto, & Ravizza, 1999; McLaughlin, 
Kubzansky, Dunn, Waldinger, Vaillant, & Koenan; 2010; Striegel-Moore, Silberstein, 
Frensch, & Rodin; 1988), the naturalistic stress students experience in the beginning of 
their undergraduate career makes this sample ideal.   
Participants will first complete self-report questionnaires that assess each 
construct, including TAF.  Then, given the need for research to include semi-idiographic 
and methodologically varied measurements (Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Kazdin, 2002), a 
subset of participants will also complete an empirically validated in vivo behavioral 
measure of TAF (Berman, Abramowitz, et al., 2011).  In doing so, the current study 
represents the first to examine the developmental correlates of TAF using multiple 
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assessment modalities.  Based upon previous theory and empirical research, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
(1) Religiosity will significantly and positively predict both moral and likelihood TAF 
across all participants affiliating with a religion. Depending on the variability of the 
sample’s religious affiliation, religious affiliation will be examined as a moderator of the 
relationship between religiosity and TAF. It is hypothesized that religiosity will more 
strongly predict both TAF biases in a Christian and Muslim sample. 
(2) Parental guilt induction, psychological control, and childhood trauma will 
significantly and positively predict both the moral and likelihood subscale of TAF.  
(3) Intrinsic, but not extrinsic motivation for religion, will significantly and positively 
predict both the moral and likelihood subscale of TAF.  
(4) Given the likely high prevalence of Christians in the study sample (based on previous 
sampling from the UNC Psychology Participant Pool), it is hypothesized that parental 
guilt induction, parental psychological control, and intrinsic motivation will mediate the 
relationship between religiosity and both TAF biases in a Protestant and Catholic sample. 
It is predicted that of these potential mediators, intrinsic motivation will account for the 
greatest amount of variance between religiosity and TAF.  
(5) A comprehensive model that includes all indicators (religious affiliation, religiosity, 
intrinsic motivation, parental psychological control, guilt induction, and childhood 





Self-report sample.  Four hundred and seven undergraduate students in 
introductory psychology and research methods classes at University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill completed an online questionnaire battery.  Participants received course 
credit (introduction to psychology) or extra credit (research methods) for their 
participation.  Table 1 outlines the demographic characteristics for this sample.  As can 
be seen, a majority of the participants were female (68.31%) and were approximately 19-
years-old.  Both of these demographic measures were expected given that recruitment 
efforts targeted undergraduate psychology courses. Moreover, participants most 
frequently identified themselves as Caucasian (71.25%) and Christian (65.11%). A small 
number of ethnic (e.g., African-American; 11.79%) and religious minorities (e.g., Jewish; 
1.4%) participants also completed study measures.  
 In vivo sample. One hundred and seven undergraduate students (82.24% female) 
completed an experimental laboratory session subsequent to completing the online 
“screening” questionnaire battery (see above). Demographic characteristics for this 
sample are outlined in Table 2. Akin to the self-report sample, the majority of participants 
were female (82.24%), Caucasian (79.40%), and Christian (77.5%).   
Measures 
The following measures were completed by participants via an online survey tool 
(see Procedure section): 
 Demographics.  At the onset of the online questionnaire, participants were asked 
to report their gender, age, and their identified racial or ethnic group and religious 
affiliation.  Participants were then asked: “How similar are your religious beliefs and 
practices to YOUR religious beliefs and practices FIVE years ago?” (1= “Very much 
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similar,” 2 = “Moderately similar,” 3= “Moderately dissimilar,” 4= “Very much 
dissimilar”).  
Childhood trauma questionnaire – short form (CTQ-SF; Bernstein et al., 
2003).  The CTQ-SF is a 28-item self-report questionnaire that uses retrospective report 
to assess for child maltreatment.  Participants rate responses on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale (0 = Never True to 4 = Very Often True).  Five subscales are included in this 
measure (reported reliabilities are based on community samples) with five items per 
subscale: physical abuse (e.g., “People in my family hit me so hard that it left me with 
bruises or marks,” α = .83) and emotional abuse (e.g., People in my family said hurtful or 
insulting things to me,” α = .87), emotional neglect (e.g., “There was someone in my 
family who helped me feel that I was important or special,” reverse coded, α = .91), 
sexual abuse (e.g., “Someone threatened to hurt me or tell lies about me unless I did 
something sexual with them,” α = .92), and physical neglect (e.g., “I had to wear dirty 
clothes growing up,” α = .61).  Additionally, three items represent the minimization scale 
that is meant to detect the underreporting of maltreatment. As reported, the subscales 
possess moderate to high internal consistency. Although, the physical neglect subscale 
demonstrates weak internal consistency and should be interpreted with caution.  
Depression anxiety stress scale - 21 (DASS-21; Henry & Crawford, 2005). 
The DASS is a 21-item reliable and valid self-report measure of general depression, 
hyperarousal, and tension in a large non-clinical sample (Henry & Crawford, 2005). It 
measures symptoms over the past week and contains three seven-item subscales rated on 
a 4-point Likert scale (0 = “Did not apply to me at all” to 3 = “Applied to me very much, 
or most of the time”).  The Depression subscale measures dysphoric and sad mood (“I felt 
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that I had nothing to look forward to”; α = .88), the Anxiety subscale measures symptoms 
of physical arousal and fear (“I experienced trembling”; α = .90), and the Stress subscale 
measures symptoms such as tension, irritability, and overreaction to stressful events (“I 
tended to over-react to situations”; α = .90).  
Dimensional obsessive-compulsive scale (DOCS; Abramowitz et al., 2010). 
The DOCS is a 20-item self-report measure that assesses the severity of the four most 
consistently replicated OCD symptom dimensions (which correspond to four DOCS 
subscales): (1) contamination, (2) responsibility for harm and mistakes, (3) 
symmetry/ordering, and (4) unacceptable thoughts. To accommodate the heterogeneity of 
OCD symptoms and the presence of obsessions and rituals within each symptom 
dimension, each subscale begins with a description of the symptom dimension along with 
examples of representative obsessions and rituals. Within each symptom dimension, five 
items (rated 0 to 4) assess the following parameters of severity (over the past month): (a) 
time occupied by obsessions and rituals, (b) avoidance behavior, (c) associated distress, 
(d) functional interference, and (e) difficulty disregarding the obsessions and refraining 
from the compulsions. The DOCS subscales have excellent reliability in student samples 
(α = .83 - .93) and the measure converges well with other measures of OC symptoms 
(Abramowitz et al., 2010).  
Intrinsic extrinsic – revised (I/E - R; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). The I/E-R is a 
14-item self-report scale, which measures one’s intrinsic (e.g., “I try hard to live all my life 
according to my religious beliefs”) and extrinsic motivation for religion.  Two types of 
extrinsic motivation are assessed - social extrinsic (Es; “I go to religious services mostly to 
spend time with my friends”) and personally extrinsic (Ep; “What religion offers me most 
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is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow”).  Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
(1=strongly disagree, 5 =strongly agree). Using a sample of college students, Gorsuch and 
McPherson (1989) demonstrated that the intrinsic, social extrinsic, and personally extrinsic 
subscales had the following reliability scores: .83, .58, .57, respectively. When the extrinsic 
subscales are combined, an alpha of .65 was obtained. It is recognized that the reliabilities 
of the extrinsic scales are not strong, but this measure of religious motivation best assesses 
the constructs of interest.  
Maladaptive guilt-induction measure (MGIM; Donatelli et al., 2007).  MGIM 
is a 12-item self-report questionnaire assessing youth’s perceived experiences with 
parental guilt induction. Respondents are presented with several statements regarding 
guilt induction and are asked to rate the truthfulness of each statement on a Likert scale 
from 1 (not at all true) to 7 (very true). The MGIM has two empirically demonstrated 
subscales.  The disparagement subscale assesses child directed criticism and blame (e.g., 
“[My primary caregiver] makes me feel guilty even when its not my fault”; α = .84). The 
self-serving elicitation subscale assesses the frequency that parents’ exaggerate sacrifices 
that they have made for the child (e.g., [My primary caregiver] always reminds me of 
favors and sacrifices he/she has made”; α = .77). As demonstrated, both subscales have 
good internal consistency.  
Parental psychological control – youth self report (PPC-YSR; Barber, 1996). 
The PPC-YSR contains eight items that assess a primary caregiver’s invalidation of 
feelings, restriction of verbal expression, personal attack, and love withdrawal (e.g., “[My 
primary caregiver] is always trying to change how I feel or think about things”).  
Respondents are asked to rate how well each statement describes his/her primary 
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caregiver (1= “Not like him/her,” 2= “Somewhat like him/her,” 3= “A lot like him/her”).   
Cronbach’s alphas for the four possible dyads in the family were calculated, indicating 
adequate internal consistency: mother/son (α = .83), mother/daughter (α = .83), 
father/son (α = .80), and father/daughter (α = .83; Barber et al., 1996). Barber et al. 
(1996) demonstrated that the PPC-YSR is a unidimensional measure that reliably 
assesses psychological control regardless of the parent’s gender, youth’s gender, or the 
income, and race of the family.  It is important to note that items assessing guilt induction 
as a form of parental psychological control were eliminated from the PPC-YSR after 
factor analytic study. 
Santa clara religious faith scale (SCRFS; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997).  The 
SCRFS is a 10-item self-report scale, which provides a reliable and valid measure of one’s 
strength of religiosity (e.g., “I pray daily”; “My relationship with God is extremely 
important to me”).  Total scores range from 10-40, with higher scores indicating greater 
religiosity. Psychometric research demonstrates that scoring at or above 33 indicates “high 
religiosity” (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). The SCRFS has good reliability (α = .92-.95) and 
converges with other valid measures of religiosity (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). 
 Thought action fusion scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996).  This is a 19-item self-
report measure of beliefs about the importance of thoughts. It contains three subscales: 
Moral (e.g., "Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a blasphemous 
action," α = 0.90), Likelihood-other (e.g. "If I think of a relative/friend losing their job, 
this increases the risk that they will lose their job," α = .92), and Likelihood-self (e.g. "If I 
think of myself having an accident, it increases the risk that I will have an accident," α = 
.84). Each item is rated on a scale from 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly). Items 
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on the TAFS have good face validity and the measure shows good internal consistency 
(Shafran et al., 1996).  
In vivo measure of TAF.  Participants who completed the online measures, 
agreed to be contacted by a research assistant, and identified with either a major branch 
of Christianity (e.g., Protestants or Catholic) or Agnosticism or Atheism were invited to 
participate in the in vivo (behavioral) measure of TAF based on that developed by 
Berman, Abramowitz, et al. (2011).  This inclusion method and the in vivo protocol was 
reviewed and approved by the IRB.   
In this paradigm, the participant was first asked to indicate his or her current 
(baseline) level of distress/anxiety from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely anxious), by 
dragging the cursor across a visual analogue scale on the screen.  Next, participants were 
asked to think of a close (and beloved) relative such as a parent or sibling and to write the 
person’s full name on a provided note card. The participant was also shown a picture of a 
stranger (which matched the gender of the chosen relative) and told the individual’s 
“name” and that he/she was a student at UNC.  The participant was asked to write the 
strangers’ name on a provided note card as well. The experimenter then placed both note 
cards next to the desktop monitor. Participants were then presented with four sentences 
and were instructed to write the sentence on the provided note card and insert either the 
close relative’s or stranger’s name (depending on the counterbalanced order) into the 
blank. The sentences were completed one at a time and the order of the four sentences 
was also counterbalanced: 
(1) “I hope ______________ is diagnosed with cancer soon.” 
(2) “I hope ______________ goes deaf soon.” 
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(3) “I hope ______________ goes blind soon.” 
(4) “I hope ______________ contracts HIV soon.” 
After writing each sentence, the participant was asked to close his or her eyes and think 
about the situation. The participant was then asked to read the sentence out loud.  Before 
moving to the next sentence, the participant was asked to rate the following items on the 
0-100 scale: 
1. How much anxiety do you feel right now? 
2. How much guilt do you feel right now? 
3. What is the likelihood of the event occurring? 
4. How much control do you have over the event occurring? 
5. How responsible would you feel if the event did occur? 
6. How morally wrong was it to write out the sentence? 
7.  How upsetting would it if this event happened? 
8. How strong is your urge to reduce or cancel the effects of writing the sentence? 
The experiment proceeded through these steps until this process occurred for each 
of the 4 sentences. If the participant refused to write any of the sentences, the 
experimenter noted that this is OK (i.e., “I understand this is difficult for you”). 
Procedure 
After signing up for the experiment via an Internet based software program, 
participants provided consent to participate and were then directed to a secure project 
website where they completed the study measures in the same order. All data was 
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collected using Qualtrics, an online web survey development tool.1  Upon accessing the 
secure project website, participants were presented with an “instructions page.” A 
demographic questionnaire and the study questionnaires (see Measures section) then 
appeared on subsequent pages.  At the end of the last questionnaire, a debriefing 
statement was presented.  On the debriefing form, the contact information for the 
principal investigator and the faculty supervisor was provided.  Additionally, information 
regarding the UNC Anxiety and Stress Disorders Clinic was given in case any participant 
“wanted help for anxiety or other stress-related problems.”  The study was reviewed and 
approved by the University IRB.  
For the 107 participants who also completed the in vivo TAF measure, testing 
occurred individually in the Anxiety and Stress Disorders laboratory in Davie Hall. Once 
the participant arrived for the experiment, the experimenter obtained informed consent. If 
the participant consented, the experimenter initiated the in vivo tasks as described above. 
At the end of the experiment, the participant was given a debriefing form, which again 
provided the contact information for the principal investigator and the faculty supervisor. 
Information regarding the UNC Anxiety and Stress Disorders Clinic was also given in 
case any participant “wanted help for anxiety or other stress-related problems.” The study 
was reviewed and approved by the University IRB.  
Results 
Data Management 
                                                        1 Coles, Cook, and Blake (2007) found that administering psychological assessment 
measures with Internet-based and paper-and-pencil formats yields highly comparable 
results. 
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It is possible that college students change their religious practices upon 
matriculating and moving (often for the first time) out of their parents’ home. Given that 
the current study is, in part, concerned with how developmental experiences impact the 
relationship between religiosity and TAF, it is important that only participants whose 
religiosity has not changed over time be included in certain analyses. Thus, when testing 
religious-related hypotheses, only those participants who reported that their strength of 
religiosity was “moderately similar” or “very similar” to their religiosity 5 years ago (i.e., 
period of adolescence since most participants are first-year undergraduates) were 
included.  If participants reported that their religiosity had moderately or drastically 
changed in the past 5 years, then their current ratings would not accurately reflect their 
developmental experience with religion.  Therefore, these participants were not included 
in religious-related analyses.  
Power analyses  
Given our sample size and 10 parameter estimates, we conducted a number of 
power analyses for the comprehensive model.  Using G*Power 3.1, power was calculated 
using the “Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R2 deviation from zero,” which is 
part of the “F-test” family.  For the self-report sample, 240 participants (excludes 
participants whose religiosity changed over the past 5 years) were included in the path 
analysis to test the comprehensive model. With an error probability rate (α) of .05, 10 
predictors, and a sample size of 240, the power is .72 for small (.05), and .99 for both 
medium (.15) and large (.35) effect sizes.  For the in vivo sample, 79 participants 
(excludes participants whose religiosity changed over the past 5 years) were included in 
the path analysis to test the comprehensive model. With an error probability rate of .05, 
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10 predictors, and a sample size of 79, the power is .19 for a small effect size (.05), .57 
for a medium effect size (.15), and .95 for a large effect size (.35). As can be seen from 
the power analyses, the sample size for the self-report sample provides adequate power to 
detect a medium and large effect; however, for the in vivo sample, we can only detect a 
large effect size. Consequently, certain pathways might not emerge as significant if their 
effect size is small.  In order to obtain sufficient power to detect a small effect size for 
either sample, we would need at least 425 participants (i.e., approximately 350 more 
participants for the in vivo sample).   
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations 
Self-report. We first investigated the relationship between the indicators and 
TAF using the self-report measure, TAFS, as the dependent variable.  Descriptive 
statistics were calculated for the subscales and total scores for: strength of religiosity, 
motivational orientation toward religion (intrinsic and extrinsic), parental guilt induction 
(self-serving elicitation and disparagement), parental psychological control, childhood 
trauma (physical and emotional abuse, emotional neglect, sexual abuse, and physical 
neglect), and TAF (moral and likelihood). Table 3 presents the mean, standard deviation, 
and range for each study measure.  
As can be seen, for religious-related variables, descriptive statistics were 
calculated separately for participants affiliating with Christianity and with 
Atheism/Agnosticism. Christians scored moderately high on measures of religiosity and 
intrinsic motivation, whereas Atheists/Agnostics’ scores on these measures were 
moderately low (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). Not 
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surprisingly, Atheists/Agnostics scored significantly lower than Christians on all 
religious-related measures (p < .05). 
Figures 1 and 2 highlight that on measures of religiosity, the range of scores for 
Christians was much wider than the range for Atheists/Agnostics.  Moreover, 
Atheists/Agnostics’ scores were restricted in range, a consequence of their expectedly 
low levels of religiosity. A similar pattern of religious group differences was found on 
measures of religious motivation (Table 3). It was expected that Atheists/Agnostics 
would score low on these measures given that many of the religiosity (e.g., “I pray daily” 
and “My relationship with God is important to me”) and religious motivation items (e.g., 
“I go to religious services because it helps me make friends” and “What religion offers 
me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow”) do not apply to individuals without 
religious faith.  Moreover, these measures were not validated in an Atheist/Agnostic 
sample.  In the analyses that follow, rather than exclude Atheists/Agnostics, religious 
affiliation (or lack thereof) was considered a moderator variable.  Consequently, 
Atheist/Agnostic participants were included in path analyses that tested the 
comprehensive model.  However, for religious-related analyses, only results for Christian 
participants could be interpreted since the religious questionnaires do not accurately or 
reliably measure the strength or motivation for religiosity in Atheists/Agnostics.    
In regards to parenting strategies, moderate levels of psychological control and 
parental guilt induction were found (Table 3), with the means being typical of nonclinical 
youth (Donatelli et al., 2007).  For childhood trauma ratings, the score for each type of 
trauma was very low, with emotional neglect being reported most frequently.  The rare 
reporting of childhood traumas might lead to floor effects in future analyses. Finally, for 
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the self-report measure of TAF, participants reported moderate levels of moral TAF and 
low levels of likelihood TAF, both within the range of typical responses for a nonclinical 
sample (Rassin, Merkelbach, et al., 2001).    
Next, we evaluated zero-order correlations among the indicators and the 
dependent variable (TAFS).  Table 4 displays the correlation matrix.  For these analyses, 
all correlations involving religious-related variables excluded individuals whose 
religiosity had changed in the past 5 years (shaded region of the correlation matrix).  As 
expected, correlations indicated that most religious-related variables were positively 
associated with one another.  However, a distinct relationship emerged between the 
subscales of TAFS and religious-related variables:  All four religious-related measures 
possessed a significant, moderate, and positive relationship with TAFS-Moral, but only 
the extrinsic motivation subscales possessed a significant and positive relationship with 
TAFS-Likelihood.  
Beyond religious-related variables, strong relationships were observed between 
the self-serving and disparagement types of parental guilt induction.  Given the strength 
of this relationship (r = .87, p < .001), subsequent analyses combined the subscales to 
create a total guilt induction score. In doing so, the number of parameters needing to be 
estimated in path analyses was minimized.   
Surprisingly, both types of maladaptive guilt induction and psychological control 
possessed a significantly moderate and positive relationship with each type of childhood 
trauma.  Moreover, correlations between psychological control and both types of guilt 
induction were significant, moderate, and positive.  Given the strength of these 
correlations (r’s between .57 and .61, p < .001), the creation of a “parenting strategies” 
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latent variable was not appropriate.  It seems that psychological control and guilt 
induction measure a similar type of parenting strategy (Barber & Harmon, 2002), but are 
independent constructs and were treated as such in subsequent regression and path 
analyses.   Lastly, all types of childhood trauma were significantly and positively 
correlated with each other, with the magnitude of the relationship ranging from weak 
(sexual abuse and emotional neglect; r = .25, p < .001) to moderately strong (physical 
abuse and emotional abuse, r = .68, p < .001).  
The relationship between parenting strategies, childhood trauma and the subscales 
of the TAFS indicated that all constructs were significantly and positively related to 
TAFS-Likelihood (r’s range from .11 - .31); however, only emotional and physical abuse 
possessed a significant, positive, and weak relationship with TAFS-Moral (significant r’s 
range from .13 - .20).  The associations between these constructs and TAF are further 
evaluated in regression and path analyses.  
In vivo. As in the self-report sample, a single measure of TAF-Likelihood and 
TAF–Moral was needed.  In other words, the four different TAF measures (i.e., 
inductions) needed to be evaluated to determine which (if not all) were appropriate 
measurements for the DV.   Prior to simply averaging in vivo ratings for the 4 different 
negative scenarios (cancer, HIV, blindness, and deafness), it was first necessary to ensure 
that each TAF induction was perceived to be similarly upsetting/severe (“how upsetting 
would it be if the event actually occurred”).  Given that considering a relative being 
diagnosed with a medical illness has been associated with higher ratings of TAF, when 
compared to a stranger (Berman, Wheaton, Fabricant, Jacobson, & Abramowitz, 2011), 
only sentences in which the participant considered a relative were used in present 
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analyses.  Because of the random assignment and counterbalancing of the target subject 
in the induction, each participant only contemplated a relative for 2 out of the 4 
sentences.  For relative sentences, if ratings of severity were not significantly different, 
then participants’ follow-up responses could be averaged across all inductions (e.g., each 
participant would end up with one score for his/her rating of likelihood).  If significant 
differences emerged, then the sentence(s) that were rated as most upsetting would be 
averaged and used as the DV. 
To determine whether the inductions significantly differed on ratings of severity, 
independent and paired samples t-tests were conducted.  Different types of t-tests were 
needed given the counterbalanced order of the inductions and the randomization of the 
target subject (i.e., relative or stranger). Paired samples t-tests were used when the two 
inductions being compared (e.g., HIV-Deaf) both involved thinking about a “relative.” 
Independent samples t-tests were used when the two inductions being compared (e.g., 
HIV-Blind) involved thinking about a stranger in one and a relative in the other.  In this 
case, responses for the relative condition needed to be compared between subjects, rather 
than within.   
As can be seen in Table 5, thinking about a relative being diagnosed with cancer 
or HIV was considered to be similarly upsetting or severe (p > .05). However, a 
diagnosis of cancer or HIV was rated as more upsetting than a relative going blind or deaf 
(p’s < .05).  Lastly, thinking about a relative going blind or deaf was rated as equally 
upsetting (p > .05).  Given that the severity of a cancer or HIV diagnosis was rated to be 
more upsetting than blindness and deafness, the cancer and HIV in vivo ratings were 
averaged.  Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations for the averaged in vivo 
  37
ratings.  Many of the in vivo ratings were fairly low given the range of scores, but these 
findings are consistent with previous in vivo TAF inductions using a nonclinical sample 
(Berman et al., 2010).  For future analyses, the in vivo rating of likelihood represents 
TAF-Likelihood and the in vivo rating of moral wrongness represents TAF-Moral.  
As a manipulation check on the validity of our TAF induction, zero-order 
correlations between the subscales of the TAFS and the in vivo TAF ratings were 
conducted.  Table 7 presents the bivariate correlations, which indicate that the 
relationships between the self-report scale and the in vivo measure, on the whole, were 
weak.  However, significant and positive correlations between the variables of interest 
(TAFS-Moral and in vivo Moral: r = .18, p < .05; TAFS-Likelihood and in vivo 
Likelihood: r = .18, p < .05) were observed, which demonstrate that the TAFS and the in 
vivo ratings are assessing distinct constructs that can co-occur.  
Descriptive statistics for the in vivo sample are provided in Table 8.  To examine 
similarities between the self-report sample and the subset of participants involved in the 
in vivo paradigm, we conducted independent samples t-tests for each questionnaire.  To 
perform these analyses, we excluded participants in the self-report sample that took part 
in the in vivo paradigm (N = 107), which allowed us to examine whether individuals that 
participated in the in vivo paradigm were different than those that only completed the 
self-report measures.  Therefore, the 300 remaining participants in the self-report sample 
were compared to the 107 participants from the in vivo paradigm.  Results indicated that 
there were no significant differences between the self-report and in vivo sample on any 
questionnaire (p > .05), suggesting that individuals who were recruited to participate in 
the in vivo paradigm were representative of the total sample.  
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Zero-order correlations between the indicators and in vivo ratings of TAF are 
presented in Table 9. Comparing these statistics to those obtained with the self-report 
sample, the correlations among the predictors are nearly identical in direction, magnitude, 
and significance. Minor differences between the self-report and in vivo sample include a 
loss of significance between religious motivation variables and the types of childhood 
trauma.  More importantly, the relationship between the predictors and in vivo ratings of 
TAF were considerably different than those found with the TAFS.  Only the in vivo 
moral rating was found to be significantly correlated with emotional neglect (r = -.23, p < 
.05).  This observed relationship is stronger than the correlation observed in the self-
report sample between emotional neglect and TAFS-Moral (r = -.05, p > .05).  It is 
important to highlight that the pattern found in the self-report sample between the 
predictors and TAFS (i.e., all religious-related variables were positively and significantly 
related to TAFS-Moral; whereas parenting strategies and childhood trauma were 
positively and significantly related to TAFS-Likelihood) was not observed with in vivo 
ratings of TAF.   
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that religiosity would significantly and positively predict 
both the moral and likelihood biases of TAF across all participants affiliating with a 
religion.  Due to the limited variation of religious affiliation (see Table 1), participants 
not affiliating with Christianity or Atheism/Agnosticism were excluded.  First, 
independent samples t-tests were conducted to determine the relationship between 
religious affiliation (Christian vs. Atheist/Agnostic) and TAF. Next, separate regression 
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analyses with the Santa Clara Religious Faith Scale (SCRFS) were conducted for both 
TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood.  
TAFS. Independent samples t-tests indicated that Christian participants (M = 
9.82, SD = 8.42) were significantly higher on TAFS-Moral compared to 
Atheists/Agnostics (M = 4.71, SD = 6.05; t(202) = -3.83, p < .001).  Conversely, no 
religious group differences were found between Christians (M = 1.77; SD = 3.23) and 
Atheists/Agnostics (M = 1.73, SD = 3.55) on TAFS-Likelihood (t(202) = -.07, p > .05).  
For strength of religiosity, the SCRFS (Table 10; Model 1a) was not a significant 
predictor of TAFS-Likelihood among Christians (F(1, 155) = .94, p > .05) or 
Atheists/Agnostics (F(1, 42) = 3.71, p > .05). However, for TAFS-Moral (Table 11), 
strength of religiosity (Model 1b) was a significant predictor among Christians (F(1, 155) 
= 14.57, p < .001) and Atheists/Agnostics (F(1, 43) = 13.25, p < .01). To determine 
whether religious affiliation moderated the relationship between SCRFS and TAFS-
Moral, a dummy variable (Rel_Affil) was created that coded affiliation with Christianity 
as (0) and affiliation with Atheism/Agnosticism as (1).  An interaction term was 
calculated that multiplied SCRFS (as a standardized variable) by Rel_Affil.  A 
hierarchical regression was then conducted with SCRFS and Rel_Affil in Step 1 and the 
interaction term (SCRFS_Standard*Rel_Affil) in Step 2. Results indicated that a 
significant amount of variance in TAFS-Moral was accounted for when the interaction 
term was added to the predictor and moderator variables (∆R2 change = .04, F(1, 97) = 
4.94, p < .05). Thus, religious affiliation moderated the effects of religiosity on TAFS-
Moral, in that affiliation with Christianity was more strongly associated with TAFS-
Moral, when compared to Atheists/Agnostics.  
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In vivo ratings. For in vivo ratings of TAF-Moral, independent samples t-tests 
indicated that Christian participants (M = 40.66, SD = 36.73) did not significantly differ 
from Atheists/Agnostics (M = 31.47, SD = 30.57; t(77) = .35, p > .05).  Similarly, no 
religious group differences were found between Christians (M = 9.87; SD = 20.65) and 
Atheists/Agnostics (M = 9.12, SD = 11.11) for TAF-Likelihood (t(76) = .14, p > .05).  
For strength of religiosity, the SCRFS did not significantly predict TAF-
Likelihood (Table 12; Model 1c) for Christians (F(1, 60) = .96, p > .05) or 
Atheists/Agnostics (F(1, 14) = .001, p > .05).  Similarly, the SCRFS did not significantly 
predict TAF-Moral (Table 13; Model 1d) for Christians (F(1, 60) = .001, p > .05) or 
Atheists/Agnostics (F(1, 15) = .29, p > .05). Moreover, religious affiliation was not 
found to moderate the relationship between religiosity and TAF-Likelihood or –Moral.    
Summary. For the TAFS, affiliation with Christianity was associated with higher 
scores of TAF-Moral. Furthermore, a stronger degree of Christian religiosity significantly 
and positively predicted TAF-Moral.  The same relationships, however, were not found 
with in vivo ratings of TAF-Moral; rather, no significant religious-related differences 
were obtained.  For TAF-Likelihood, neither the TAFS nor the in vivo ratings yielded 
significant religious-related differences.  
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that parental guilt induction, psychological control, and 
childhood trauma would significantly and positively predict both the moral and 
likelihood biases of TAF.  To test this hypothesis, total scores on the Maladaptive Guilt 
Induction measure, Parent Psychological Control – Youth Self-Report, and the subscales 
on the Child Trauma Questionnaire, were separately entered into regression models that 
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predicted both TAF biases. Given that these analyses do not involve religious-related 
constructs, participants were not excluded if they reported a change in their strength of 
religiosity in the past 5 years.  
TAFS. For TAFS-Likelihood (Table 10), psychological control (Model 4a; F(1, 
251) = 5.70, p < .05), parental guilt induction (Model 5a; F(1, 242) = .10.58, p < .001), 
and childhood trauma (Model 6a; F(5, 220) = 4.45, p < .001) were all significant and 
positive predictors.  Of the childhood trauma subscales, emotional abuse and physical 
neglect emerged as unique predictors. For TAFS-Moral (Table 11), psychological control 
(4b; F(1, 251) = 2.29, p > .05) and guilt induction (Model 5b; F(1, 241) = .001, p > .05) 
were not found to be significant predictors. However, childhood trauma (Model 6b; F(5, 
219) = 4.00, p < .01) accounted for a significant amount of variance in TAFS-Moral, 
with physical abuse emerging as a unique predictor.  
In vivo ratings. For TAF-Likelihood (Table 12), psychological control (Model 
4c; F(1, 101) = .07, p > .05), parental guilt induction (Model 5c; F(1, 104) = .50, p > 
.05), and childhood trauma (Model 6c; F(5, 73) = .48, p > .05) were not found to be 
significant predictors.  For TAF-Moral (Table 13), psychological control (Model 4d; F(1, 
102) = .10, p > .05), parental guilt induction (Model 5d; F(1, 105) = .69, p > .05), and 
childhood trauma (Model 6d; F(5, 74) = 1.68, p > .05) were also not found to be 
significant predictors.   
Summary.  For the TAFS, parental psychological control and guilt induction, as 
well as childhood trauma, specifically experiences with emotional abuse or physical 
neglect, positively and significantly predicted TAF-Likelihood. The same relationships, 
however, were not found with in vivo ratings of TAF-Likelihood; rather, none of the 
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indicators were significant predictors.  For TAF-Moral, childhood trauma, specifically 
physical abuse, was found to significantly predict the TAFS. However, none of the 
indicators were significant predictors for in vivo ratings of TAF-Moral.  
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that intrinsic, but not extrinsic motivation for religion, 
would significantly and positively predict both the moral and likelihood biases of TAF in 
participants affiliating with a religion. Given that these analyses do involve religious-
related constructs, participants were excluded if they reported a change in their strength 
of religiosity in the past 5 years. To test this hypothesis, separate regression analyses 
were conducted with intrinsic and extrinsic (social and personal subscales) motivation.  
TAFS. For TAFS-Likelihood (Table 10), intrinsic motivation (Model 2a) was not 
a significant predictor for Christians (F(1,156) = .22, p > .05) or Atheists/Agnostics 
(F(1,42) = .02, p > .05). However, for Atheists/Agnostics, extrinsic motivation (Model 
3a) accounted for a significant amount of variance in TAFS-Likelihood (F(2, 42) = 5.09, 
p < .05), with the extrinsic-personal subscale emerging as a unique predictor.  For 
Christians, extrinsic motivation was not a significant predictor for TAFS-Likelihood 
(F(2,156) = 2.39, p > .05).  
For TAFS-Moral (Table 11), intrinsic motivation (Model 2b) predicted a 
significant amount of variance for Christians (F(1, 155) = 16.31, p < .001) and 
Atheists/Agnostics (F(1, 43) = 6.52, p < .05).  Similarly, extrinsic motivation (Model 3b) 
predicted a significant amount of variance in TAFS-Moral for Christians (F(2, 155) = 
10.09, p < .05) and Atheists/Agnostics (F(2, 43) = 10.11, p < .001), with the social 
subscale emerging as a unique predictor for both religious groups.  To determine whether 
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religious affiliation moderated the relationship between intrinsic or extrinsic motivation 
and TAFS-Moral, the dummy coded variable (Rel_Affil) and interaction terms (e.g., 
Standard_Intrinsic*Rel_Affil) were entered into hierarchical regression analyses.  
Religious motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic were conducted separately) and Rel_Affil 
were entered into Step 1 and the interaction terms were entered into Step 2. Results 
indicated that religious affiliation did not moderate the effects of religious motivation on 
TAFS-Moral or –Likelihood.  
In vivo ratings. For TAF-Likelihood (Table 12), intrinsic motivation (Model 2c) 
was not a significant predictor for Christians (F(1, 60) = 1.69, p > .05) or 
Atheists/Agnostics (F(1, 14) = 2.67, p > .05). Moreover, neither subscale of extrinsic 
motivation (Model 3c) was found to significantly predict TAF-Likelihood for Christians 
(F(2, 59) = .52, p > .05) or Atheists/Agnostics (F(2, 13) = 1.14, p > .05). For TAF-Moral 
(Table 13), a similar pattern of results was obtained.  Intrinsic motivation (Model 2d) did 
not significantly predict TAF-Moral for Christians (F(1, 60) = .49, p > .05) or 
Atheists/Agnostics (F(1, 15) = .34, p > .05) and neither subscale of extrinsic motivation 
predicted TAF-Moral (Model 4d) for Christians (F(2, 59) = .83, p > .05) or 
Atheists/Agnostics (F(2, 14) = .07, p > .05).  Not surprisingly, religious affiliation was 
not found to moderate the relationship between religiosity and TAF-Moral or TAF-
Likelihood.   
Summary.  Intrinsic motivation for religion significantly and positively predicted 
TAF-Moral for both Christians and Atheists/Agnostics. This relationship, however, was 
not observed with in vivo ratings of TAF-Moral. Further, extrinsic motivation for religion 
(social subscale) significantly and positively predicted the TAFS-Moral subscale for 
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members of both religious affiliations, but this was not replicated with in vivo ratings of 
TAF-Moral. For TAF-Likelihood, extrinsic motivation for religion, the social subscale, 
was a significant and positive predictor for Atheists/Agnostics, but this was not replicated 
with the in vivo rating of TAF-Likelihood.  It is important to recall that due to the 
restricted range of Atheist/Agnostics’ scores on religious measures, along with the fact 
that these questionnaires were neither intended for, nor validated on, this sample, the 
significant effects of religious motivation on TAF for Atheists/Agnostics should not be 
interpreted. The potentially spurious nature of these results, as well as other reasons for 
their significance, will be considered in the Discussion.  
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that (1) guilt induction, psychological control, and 
intrinsic motivation would mediate the relationship between religiosity and both TAF 
biases, (2) this mediation would be conditional upon affiliation with Christianity, and (3) 
intrinsic motivation would account for the greatest amount of variance between 
religiosity and TAF.  Specifically, this analysis tested whether intrinsic motivation (M1), 
psychological control (M2), and guilt induction (M3) mediated the relationship between X 
(religiosity) and Y1 (TAF-Moral) or Y2 (TAF-Likelihood).   
To test indirect effects, we followed Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) recommendation 
to use the bootstrapping technique.  This statistical method samples the data thousands of 
times and estimates the indirect effect in each resampled data set.  An empirical 
approximation of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect (ab) and its confidence 
intervals is then constructed.  Bootstrapping is preferred over other popular methods of 
testing indirect effects (e.g., Sobel test) because it possesses higher power and minimizes 
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Type I error rates (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
We also tested whether religious affiliation (W) moderated the mediation effects.  
To test for moderated mediation (i.e., psychological control only mediates the 
relationship between religiosity and TAF-Moral for Christians, but not for 
Atheists/Agnostics), the dummy coded religious affiliation variable (Rel_Affil; W) and an 
interaction term (X*W; product of religiosity and dummy coded religious affiliation) 
were included as predictors of TAF.   
To statistically test for multiple causal pathways and potential mediation, path 
analysis was optimal, given that it (1) estimates the magnitude and significance of 
hypothesized causal relationships between the indicators (predictor variables) and TAF 
(dependent variable), (2) uses observed variables to simultaneously assess indirect and 
direct effects in the prediction of TAF, and (3) provides goodness of fit indices for 
comprehensive models.  For all of the following path analyses, note that (1) participants 
were excluded if they reported a change in their strength of religiosity in the past 5 years, 
(2) due to the multiple number of analyses and beta values, only significant findings are 
reported, (3) given the coding of the interaction term, parameter estimates for moderation 
analyses refer to those affiliating with Christianity, and (4) the parameter estimates, 
indirect, direct, and total effects are reported in standardized form.  
TAFS. The first set of path analyses were conducted with the TAFS-Moral 
subscale as the dependent variable.  Results indicated that for the Mediator Model (M’s 
as outcome), religiosity significantly predicted psychological control (β = .46, SE = .08, p 
< .001), guilt induction (β = .11, SE = .02, p < .01), and intrinsic motivation (β = .26, SE 
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= .06, p < .01). For the Dependent Variable Model (Y as outcome), only intrinsic 
motivation was found to significantly predict TAFS-Moral (β = .29, SE = .10, p < .01).  
 Next, the indirect, direct, and total effects were examined.  The direct (c’) and 
total (c; direct + indirect) effects were not significant.  The indirect effect of religiosity on 
TAF-Moral was significant for Christians (abtotal_Christians = .12, 95% Bootstrapping 
Confidence Interval (BCI) = .005 - .24, SE = .06, p < .05) and for this religious group the 
only significant mediator was intrinsic motivation (abintrin_Christians = .08, 95% BCI = .01 - 
.14, SE = .03, p < .05).  Specifically, the relationship between strength of religiosity and 
TAFS-Moral was mediated by intrinsic motivation, but this mediational effect was 
conditional upon affiliation with Christianity.  
 The next set of path analyses were conducted with the TAFS-Likelihood subscale 
as the dependent variable. Beyond those identified in the Mediator Model above, no 
significant predictors were specific to TAFS-Likelihood. Therefore, no significant 
mediation or moderation effects were detected in the prediction of TAFS-Likelihood.  
In vivo ratings. The next path analyses were conducted with the in vivo rating of 
TAF-Moral as the dependent variable.  Results indicated, similar to the self-report 
sample, that for the Mediator Model, religiosity significantly predicted psychological 
control (β = .56, SE = .13, p < .001), guilt induction (β = .11, SE = .03, p < .01), and 
intrinsic motivation (β = .28, SE = .09, p < .01). However, for the Dependent Variable 
Model (Y as outcome), no variables significantly predicted in vivo TAF-Moral and no 
significant indirect, direct, or total effects were found.  Lastly, religious affiliation did not 
moderate any of the mediation pathways between strength of religiosity and in vivo 
ratings of TAF-Moral.  
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 The last path analysis for this hypothesis was conducted with the in vivo rating of 
TAF-Likelihood as the dependent variable. Beyond those identified in the Mediator 
Model above, no significant predictors were found to be specific to in vivo ratings of 
TAF-Likelihood. Therefore, no significant mediation or moderation effects were detected 
for in vivo ratings of TAF-Likelihood.  
Summary. Results indicated that in both the self-report and in vivo sample, 
strength of religiosity significantly and positively predicted psychological control, guilt 
induction, and intrinsic motivation.  For TAF-Moral, moderated mediation was observed 
for the self-report sample, such that the relationship between strength of religiosity and 
TAFS-Moral was mediated by intrinsic motivation, but this effect was conditional upon 
affiliation with Christianity. This effect was not replicated with in vivo ratings of TAF-
Moral.  Moreover, no significant mediation or moderated mediation was observed in the 
prediction of both self-report and in vivo likelihood TAF.  
Hypothesis 5 
 Hypothesis 5 stated that a comprehensive model - all indicators and proposed 
mediation and moderation effects in the prediction of the moral and likelihood biases of 
TAF - would fit the data well.  The following goodness of fit indices were used to 
determine the models’ goodness of fit: (1) statistically nonsignificant chi square test 
(indicating no difference between the sample and model covariance matrix), (2) CFI 
between .90 – 1.00, (3) Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) between 
.00 - .05, and (4), the 90% confidence interval for the RMSEA (used for the “test of close 
fit”) includes “0” (Hu & Bentler, 1999).   
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 TAFS. For TAFS-Likelihood (Figure 3), the comprehensive model is very misfit 
(χ2(22) = 452.82, p < .001; CFI = .17; RMSEA = .30; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.28 - 0.32) and 
the predictors significantly accounted for 14% of the variance (p < .01) in the DV.  
Additionally, the direct effects of psychological control and guilt induction that emerged 
in regression analyses (hypothesis 2) disappeared in the comprehensive model.  As seen 
in Figure 4, the comprehensive model predicting TAFS-Moral is also poorly fit  (χ2(22) = 
452.65, p < .001; CFI = .21; RMSEA = .30; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.27 - 0.33), but 
accounted for a notable and significant amount of variance (R2 = 23.3%, p < .001) in the 
DV.  All direct effects that emerged in previous analyses (religiosity, intrinsic motivation, 
and physical abuse) were also found to be significant pathways in the comprehensive 
model.  
In vivo ratings. As demonstrated in Figure 5, the comprehensive model 
predicting in vivo TAF-Likelihood is very misfit (χ2(22) = 79.19, p < .001; CFI = .38; 
RMSEA = .21; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.17 - 0.27) and accounted for 9% of the variance (p > 
.05).  As seen in Figure 6, the comprehensive model predicting in vivo TAF-Moral is also 
misfit  (χ2(22) = 84.40, p < .001; CFI = .41; RMSEA = .23; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.18 - 
0.28), but accounts for a significant amount of variance, 29% (p < .05), in the DV.  
Summary. In the prediction of TAF-Moral, the comprehensive model for both 
the self-report and in vivo sample fit the data poorly; thus, the model implied covariance 
matrix does not fit my observed covariance matrix.  However, the indicators, and 
mediation and moderation effects accounted for a significant amount of the variance in 
both TAF-Moral measures. In the prediction of TAF-Likelihood, the comprehensive 
model for both the self-report and in vivo sample fit the data very poorly and the 
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pathways only accounted for a significant amount of the variance in the self-report 
sample.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 In addition to analyses that tested our hypotheses, we conducted exploratory 
analyses to better understand: (1) the impact of exclusionary criteria on model fit, (2) 
additional mediational pathways, and (3) the specificity of our variables in the prediction 
of TAF. These analyses are discussed in Appendix A.  
Discussion 
Cognitive biases, such as TAF, play a crucial role in the cognitive-behavioral 
model of anxiety disorders and have been shown to prospectively increase the risk of 
developing future psychopathology (Abramowitz, et al., 2006; Abramowitz, et al., 2003). 
Given that TAF operates as a distinct psychological vulnerability factor, inhibiting or 
preventing the development of TAF could help avert maladaptive psychopathological 
outcomes (Kraemer et al., 2001; Timpano et al., 2011). However, little research has 
examined the risk factors for this theoretically important construct. Therefore, the current 
study examined possible developmental correlates (and potential risk factors) of TAF 
using a multi-method approach and aimed to understand how religion, parenting 
practices, and childhood trauma predict TAF beliefs.  
The key findings of our study can be summarized as follows: unexpectedly, 
religious-related variables primarily predicted the moral bias of TAF, whereas parenting 
strategies and childhood trauma were associated with the likelihood bias.  This pattern of 
results suggests that the aforementioned developmental experiences possess unique 
relationships with each TAF bias.  Moreover, distinct mediation pathways were observed 
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for the moral and likelihood bias: intrinsic motivation mediated the relationship between 
religiosity and the moral bias in a Christian sample and psychological control mediated 
the relationship between both emotional neglect and emotional abuse and the likelihood 
bias (as seen in Appendix A).  Despite the demonstrated mediation and moderation 
effects, comprehensive models predicting each bias were severely misfit.   
Our first hypothesis, that strength of religiosity would predict both biases of TAF 
in a Christian sample, was partially supported. Specifically, with Christian participants on 
self-report measures, a stronger sense of religiosity was associated with higher ratings of 
moral TAF. No religious group differences, however, were found for the likelihood bias 
of TAF, suggesting that neither affiliation with Christianity nor strength of religiosity was 
associated with misinterpreting the powerfulness of one’s thoughts in causing external 
negative events. These findings are consistent with previous questionnaire research 
demonstrating relationships between religiosity and TAF (Abramowitz et al., 2002; 
Abramowitz et al., 2004; Rassin & Koster, 2003), particularly Siev and Cohen’s (2010) 
work, which demonstrated a positive relationship between religiosity and moral TAF in a 
Christian sample.  Contrary to our predictions, our in vivo measure of TAF was not 
associated with religious affiliation or strength of religiosity, which is inconsistent with 
research using laboratory paradigms of TAF (Berman et al., 2010).  
For hypothesis 2, that parental guilt induction, psychological control, and 
childhood trauma would independently predict both biases of TAF, a distinct pattern 
emerged with self-report measures that partially supported our prediction. Childhood 
experiences with guilt inducing or psychologically controlling parents, as well as 
incidents of emotional abuse and physical neglect, uniquely predicted the likelihood bias 
  51
of TAF.  This pattern of findings is consistent with Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) theoretical 
pathways towards the development of obsessive beliefs, in that authoritative practices (or 
rigid rules) within the home, along with traumatic experiences, can contribute to an 
inflated responsibility over the occurrence of external events.  
Interestingly, neither parenting practice nor the abovementioned traumas were 
predictive of misinterpreting the moral wrongfulness of thoughts; only a history of 
physical abuse contributed to the moral bias of TAF.  This relationship might stem from 
past instances in which the parent beat the child for having immoral thoughts (e.g., “God 
is dead”).  Given the likelihood that the parent also beat the child for engaging in 
immoral behaviors (e.g., swearing in church), the child might begin to believe that having 
immoral thoughts is equivalent to immoral actions.  Inconsistent with this hypothesis 
though, our in vivo ratings of TAF were not related to any type of parenting practice or 
childhood trauma.   
Hypothesis 3, that intrinsic, but not extrinsic, motivation for religion would 
predict both biases of TAF in Christian participants, was partially supported.  Consistent 
with our hypothesis and paralleling the results found for hypothesis 1, a stronger sense of 
intrinsic motivation for religion predicted the moral bias of TAF in Christians (in the self-
report sample).  This positive association provides insight into a specific element of 
religiosity that influences TAF.  It might be that intrinsically motivated individuals 
internalize religious directives, such as “sin by thought,” more strongly, therefore 
contributing to greater TAF beliefs.  
Contrary to our prediction, extrinsic motivation, specifically the social subtype, 
also predicted moral TAF, albeit not as strongly as intrinsic motivation.  These findings 
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indicate that individuals whose religiosity is motivated by social values (e.g., attending 
church to meet friends, wanting to affiliate with the “right” crowd or with powerful 
people) are likely to equate immoral thoughts with immoral actions.  This effect might be 
due to the communality of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; these two constructs possess 
a positive association and are therefore, not mutually exclusive.  Given this relationship, 
it might be that intrinsically motivated individuals are not only motivated by the values of 
religion, but are also drawn to the strong community and social elements that are built 
into the foundation of religion.  It is also possible that individuals who possess a high 
degree of extrinsic motivation frequently attend religious services for the social value and 
unintentionally internalize the religious directives of their faith (e.g., sin by thought).  
For Christian participants, neither type of religious motivation was associated 
with the likelihood bias, mirroring the pattern of findings that religious-related variables 
solely predict the moral bias. Moreover, neither type of motivational orientation was 
associated with in vivo moral or likelihood ratings.   
It cannot be ignored that religiosity and motivational orientation were significant 
predictors of TAF for Atheist/Agnostic participants. However, as previously stated, we 
are not interpreting significant findings for Atheists/Agnostics on religious-related 
predictors since these measures were not applicable/appropriate for this sample.  These 
effects might have emerged for the following reasons: (1) Atheists/Agnostics lower 
scores on measures of religiosity were associated with lower TAF scores, yielding a 
positive correlation and the restricted range. (2) Individuals identifying as 
Atheists/Agnostics might have grown up within Christian households in which children 
were expected to go to church regardless of their personal beliefs.  Consequently, 
  53
children might have internalized religious directives, despite professing and identifying 
as a “non-believer.”   
For hypothesis 4, that guilt induction, psychological control, and intrinsic 
motivation would mediate the relationship between religiosity and both biases of TAF in 
a Christian sample, and that of these potential mediators, intrinsic motivation would 
account for the greatest amount of variance between religiosity and TAF, our prediction 
was partially supported.  Although religiosity did possess positive relationships with the 
three potential mediators, intrinsic motivation emerged as the only significant mediator 
between strength of religiosity and the moral bias of TAF in a Christian sample.  
Moreover, when intrinsic motivation was taken into account, the demonstrated 
relationship between religiosity and TAF-Moral was no longer present. This complete 
mediation suggests that viewing religion as a guiding factor in life and internalizing 
religious values explains the consistently demonstrated relationship between Christian 
religiosity and moral TAF beliefs (Abramowitz et al., 2002; Abramowitz et al., 2004; 
Berman et al., 2010; Rassin & Koster, 2003; Siev & Cohen, 2010). This relationship, 
however, was not found with the in vivo measure of moral TAF.  
Contrary to our prediction, intrinsic motivation did not mediate the relationship 
between religiosity and the likelihood bias. Although psychological control and guilt 
induction were both positively associated with religiosity and the likelihood bias, these 
parenting strategies did not help explain the established relationship between strength of 
religious faith and TAF.   
Hypothesis 5, that a comprehensive model would fit the data well, was not 
supported for either bias or methodology. Although the comprehensive models explained 
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a significant amount of variance in the moral (self-report and in vivo sample) and 
likelihood (self-report sample) biases, the models were poorly fit.  This pattern of results 
likely indicates path misspecification and that critical variables were missing from the 
model.  
It should be noted that in the comprehensive models, some of the direct effects 
that were demonstrated in previous analyses remained, while others disappeared.  For the 
moral bias (self-report), religiosity, intrinsic motivation, and physical abuse continued to 
predict TAF in the context of a larger comprehensive model.  This provides additional 
support for our hypothesis that, even when controlling for other important variables, the 
aforementioned constructs were meaningful predictors of TAF. For the likelihood bias 
(self-report), neither parenting strategies were significant predictors of TAF in the context 
of the larger model. This might be due to the “omitted variable” problem.  Simple 
regression hypotheses do not take into consideration other constructs that might account 
for significant variance in the DV.  When these constructs were included, previously 
significant findings disappeared because other predictors better accounted for variance in 
the DV (Judd & Kenny, 1981; Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Therefore, it is possible that 
childhood trauma and religious-related variables accounted for some of the variance in 
the likelihood bias that had previously been accounted for by parenting strategies.  
Exploratory analyses (discussed in Appendix A) demonstrated that including 
participants whose religiosity had changed in the past 5 years did not improve the model 
fit or significantly affect indirect, direct, or total effects.  Two conclusions can be drawn 
from these results.  First, the same relationship between current religiosity and TAF 
exists regardless of whether one’s strength of religiosity has fluctuated in the past. 
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Second, adding participants did not reveal any additional significant relationships; 
therefore, pathway misspecification and missing predictors, rather than the model being 
underpowered, are likely limitations of the model.  
In examining additional mediation effects (see Appendix A), parenting practices, 
specifically psychological control, were found to mediate the relationship between both 
emotional abuse and emotional neglect and the likelihood bias. In other words, our data 
suggest that parents’ responses (e.g., invalidation of victim’s feelings) to their child’s 
harassment contributed to the development of an inflated sense of responsibility over 
causing external events.  
One explanation for this finding is that certain cognitive distortions associated 
with childhood trauma (e.g., controllability and internal attribution; Briere, 1996) parallel 
the sequelae of psychological control (e.g., child feels misplaced responsibility for events 
that he/she has not caused; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1990; Donatelli et al., 2007), and the 
likelihood bias. This explanation does not suggest a causal relationship; rather, the 
positive association among these constructs might be due to similarities in dysfunctional 
cognitions or an underlying latent construct.  
In determining the specificity of our constructs in the prediction of TAF (see 
Appendix A), results indicated that the developmental constructs possess unique 
associations with the cognitive bias.  These constructs do not similarly predict 
psychological distress, anxiety symptomology, or OCD symptom severity, in that no 
direct or indirect effects were observed with these psychopathological outcomes.  
Moreover, of all the outcome variables, these constructs best predicted the moral bias of 
TAF.  The demonstrated unique effects and amount of variance explained in moral TAF 
  56
indicate that these developmental experiences possess a relationship with TAF that is 
distinct from other forms of psychological distress.   
Throughout our multitude of analyses, a similar pattern of findings emerged: 
developmental experiences related to religion (affiliation, strength of religiosity, and 
motivational orientation) were consistently associated with the belief that immoral 
thoughts were equivalent to immoral actions; whereas, childhood experiences that occur 
within the home (e.g., parenting and emotional abuse/neglect) were found to predict 
inflated estimates of responsibility over the occurrence of external events.  The unique 
constellation of childhood experiences in the prediction of each TAF bias aligns well 
with Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) proposed pathways for the development of cognitive 
distortions.  
Within Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) framework, the moral bias stems from rigid 
rules of conduct that are set forth by authority members within religious institutions.  The 
strict moral principles, in concert with the possibility of worldly or divine retribution for 
thinking “bad” thoughts, could lead to the development of beliefs involving the moral 
equivalence of thoughts and actions. For instance, a child who is raised Christian and 
possesses a strong sense of intrinsic motivation for his/her religion might be taught the 
phenomenon of “sin by thought,” which he/she internalizes as a youth. Consequently, as 
the child ages, he/she might feel morally responsible for controlling his/her thought 
processes, thus leading to a paradoxical preoccupation with immoral thoughts and the 
emergence of clinically interfering moral TAF.   
The likelihood bias might also develop as a result of rigid rules of conduct and 
duty; however, this bias seems to be affected by a different form of authority - the 
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parents. Through certain types of parental communication, children might be taught that 
certain thoughts can lead to dangerous outcomes.  For instance, a psychologically 
controlling parent might respond to a child’s distasteful or catastrophic thoughts by 
reprimanding him/her (e.g., “Don’t think that thought! What if it happened!”).  
Consequently, the child might become fearful of having dirty or dangerous thoughts due 
to the possibility of punishment, or worse, an increased likelihood of occurrence.  
Moreover, if unwarranted blame and responsibility are placed upon a young child, he/she 
might not possess the cognitive capabilities to differentiate between problems that he/she 
caused and those that resulted from circumstances beyond his/her control (Rakow et al., 
2009). As a result, in difficult to control situations, the child might blame him/herself and 
assume responsibility for the outcome (Bybee, Zigler, Berliner, & Merisca, 1996).  These 
examples typify how behavioral codes within the home can lead to both the development 
and reinforcement of responsibility over one’s thought processes. 
In addition to psychological control and guilt induction, childhood traumas, 
especially emotional abuse and neglect, contribute to the likelihood bias.  By again 
examining the parental communication style, it might be that parents treat the child as a 
“scapegoat” (i.e., emotional abuse) and blame him/her for negative outcomes for which 
the child had no control over (e.g., financial difficulties; Salkovskis et al., 1999).  In this 
environment, the child’s feelings of responsibility for the occurrence of unfortunate 
events is repeatedly reinforced and can lead to cognitive distortions of inflated 
responsibility.  Thus, as the child ages, he/she might not understand his/her role in 
causing negative events to occur and depending on other factors (e.g., psychological 
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control), he/she might misinterpret the powerfulness of his/her thoughts on the outside 
world.    
More generally, trauma has been shown to disrupt typical cognitive development 
and lead to distortions of safety, controllability, and internal attribution (Briere, 1996; 
Browne & Winkelman, 2007).  These cognitive errors mirror those seen in the likelihood 
bias (i.e., feelings of responsibility over the occurrence of external events and being 
preoccupied with the threat of danger).  Moreover, in trauma victims, their tendency to 
avoid thinking about the event (Criterion C for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; APA, 
2002) might be an indicator of TAF, such that victims might fear that thinking about the 
event will increase the likelihood of recurrence (Rachman & Shafran, 1999).  
As the current results and Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) pathways suggest, a variety of 
factors can contribute to TAF.  Their complex interplay can be understood through the 
lens of developmental psychopathology (i.e., a number of interactional processes underlie 
an individual’s normative or maladaptive development; Cicchetti & Toth, 2009).  
Although the current study focused exclusively on psychological and socio-cultural 
components, in developmental psychopathology, it is important to also address how these 
factors interact with biological processes, thus, the potential contribution of biological 
systems in individual pathways will be addressed.  
Throughout the life course, research has demonstrated that brain function is 
affected by experiences and it is most shaped in times of neural plasticity (Cicchetti & 
Tucker, 1994).  Black, Jones, Nelson, & Greenough (1998) noted that experience-
dependent synaptogenesis (i.e., brain’s adaptation to and alteration from information that 
is unique to the individual) plays an important role in a child’s neurobiological 
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development. If, for instance, a child is sexually abused at an early age, the experience-
dependent synaptogenesis might trigger the development of abnormal neural circuitry.  
Consequently, this pathology in the brain can interfere with and distort the typical 
neurological development, leading to a number of maladaptive social and cognitive 
processes, such as TAF (Black et al, 1998; Cicchetti & Toth, 2009).   
In addition to experience-dependent synaptogenesis, other biological factors can 
influence the development of cognitive biases. Research suggests that early child 
maltreatment is associated with dysregulation in both the autonomic nervous system and 
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (Ellis, Essex, & Joyce, 2005; Loman & 
Gunnar, 2010; McLaughlin et al., 2010).  An indicator of this biological response is an 
atypical flattening of cortisol production (Cicchetti, Rogosch, Gunnar, & Toth, 2010).  
Similar to experience-dependent synaptogenesis, dysregulation of these systems can lead 
to maladaptive emotional, cognitive, and social processes (McLaughlin et al., 2010).  In 
integrating biological factors into the current study, we can hypothesize that for children 
who experience abuse at an early age, the dysregulation of cortisol production might 
interact with certain parenting strategies, such as psychological control (Alink, Cicchetti, 
Kim, & Rogosch, 2009).  As a result, the victim might develop emotional dysregulation 
and subsequently struggle with maladaptive cognitive processes (i.e., TAF; Repetti, 
Taylor, & Seeman, 2002).  
Understanding how psychological, socio-cultural, and biological factors interact is 
crucial to developing and refining intervention and prevention efforts. Researchers argue 
that it is important to not only identify risk factors that, when changed, alter the 
developmental trajectory, but also to determine when prevention efforts are most 
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efficacious (Kraemer et al., 2001).  Both biological and psychosocial prevention efforts 
have been examined as potential avenues for change. Molecular geneticists are working 
to create preventions that alter gene expression and are creating new strategies to modify 
brain abnormalities (Kandel, 1999; Cicchetti & Toth, 2009).  Research suggests that these 
strategies are most effective when neural systems possess plasticity (Cicchetti & Toth, 
2009); however, the temporal “windows” at which neural plasticity is greatest is still 
under consideration (Cicchetti & Toth, 2009).   
Psychosocial prevention efforts often target vulnerable populations to avert the 
development of psychopathology. For instance, Cicchetti, Rogosch, Toth, and Sturge-
Apple (2011) recently conducted an intervention for maltreated infants, in which families 
were given a psychosocial intervention (parent-child psychotherapy or parent training) or 
standard community services (control group).  As one outcome measure, investigators 
systematically measured children’s cortisol levels over two-years.  Results demonstrated 
that children in the psychosocial intervention developed normalized cortisol levels at the 
completion of the study, whereas children receiving standard community services 
evidenced a continual decline in cortisol levels. The success of this prevention program 
underscores the power of psychosocial interventions in regulating biological processes 
following childhood trauma (Cicchetti et al., 2011).   
Timpano et al. (2011) similarly utilized a prevention program; however, this 
intervention was designed to target a vulnerable population prior to a stressor.  Their 
prevention involved a psychoeducation program for prenatal women with obsessive 
beliefs, but not OCD. Thus, these women possessed a subsyndromal risk factor for the 
development of OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2003; 2006).  Following the child’s birth (i.e., 
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the stressor), women in the prevention program experienced significantly less obsessive 
beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms compared to women in a control group.  As 
demonstrated by these recent studies, effective prevention of psychopathology can be 
done in vulnerable pediatric and adult populations, before or after stressful life events.  
Undoubtedly, it is important to identify risk factors in the hopes of creating 
effective prevention programs; however, increasing protective or resilience factors can 
also function to alter developmental trajectories by preventing harm and “initiating a 
positive cascade of consequences” (Masten, 2011, p. 497).  A variety of resilience factors 
have been identified, such as racial socialization (Neblett, Phillip, Cogburn, & Sellers, 
2006) or a secure attachment with a caregiver (Alink et al., 2009).  Moreover, 
competence, or satisfactory performance in age-appropriate developmental tasks (e.g., 
academic achievement and respectful relationships with others for 10-year-olds) has 
consistently emerged as an important protective factor (Masten & Coatsworth, 1998; 
Masten, 2011).  Thus, increasing children’s competence and exposure to positive 
influences might promote healthy development to a similar degree as prevention 
programs that target risk factors.  
Given our significant predictors, we can draw upon risk and resilience research to 
inform a systematic prevention of TAF.  Although, we cannot refute children’s or 
families’ religious beliefs, certain family factors or parenting strategies that are predictive 
of TAF can be therapeutically addressed.  Given that childhood trauma consistently 
emerged as a significant predictor, one approach could involve obtaining access to files at 
Child Protective Services (Cicchetti et al., 2011), and contacting families to assess the 
child’s current psychological functioning.  If maltreated children have not yet developed 
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TAF or other forms of psychopathology, families could be offered an empirically 
supported psychoeducational intervention for TAF (Zucker et al., 2002) as well as 
trauma-focused CBT (Foa, Keane, & Friedman, 2000).  Another approach that has 
received empirical support in prevention research involves screening children and 
adolescents in primary care (Jellinek, Murphy, Little, Pagano, Comer, & Kelleher, 1999) 
or school-based settings (Gail, Pagano, Desmond, Perrin, & Murphy, 2000).  Broad 
measures of psychological functioning, parenting, and child safety could be administered, 
and youth who score highly on measures of parental psychological control, guilt 
induction, or maltreatment could be identified as “vulnerable.” If the child has 
experienced trauma, the family could be offered trauma-focused CBT, but if parenting 
style is a significant concern, then family-based therapy approaches could be employed to 
increase effective communication strategies between parents and children (Dattilio & 
Epstein, 2004).   
Lastly, for children and adolescents at risk of developing cognitive biases, a 
resilience framework could direct approaches for promoting healthy functioning.  One 
such method is strength-based school counseling (Akos & Galassi, 2008), in which 
critical members of school staff (i.e., administrators, teachers, guidance counselors) work 
to proactively build a nurturing academic community that promotes personal and social 
competence, while paying special attention to cultural considerations.  Within this 
environment, staff members are instructed to focus upon students’ assets.  Resiliency 
efforts, like strength-based school counseling, and preventative approaches, like 
screening for maltreatment and offering trauma-focused CBT, would first need to be 
rigorously tested through randomized preventive trials to determine whether these 
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interventions can avert the development of cognitive biases in at-risk youth (Kraemer et 
al., 2001).   
For a number of reasons, caution is warranted regarding the conclusions of the 
present study. First, the measurement and construct validity of the in vivo TAF measure 
was a significant limitation.  In regards to the negative event (cancer and HIV), some 
participants might have more or less personal experience with these diseases, which 
might have influenced their ratings of likelihood or moral wrongness.  Moreover, since 
previous research (Holmes & Mathews, 2010) suggests that recall of past emotional 
episodes can influence the degree of mental imagery, it might be that some participants 
generated more vivid images than others. In order to control for this potential confound, 
future research could assess the vividness of the image and degree of similarity of the 
image to a memory.  Additionally, future research should provide greater specificity for 
the negative event (e.g., skin or pancreatic cancer). The lack of specificity might have led 
to individual variability in the imagined event.  
Further, the relationship between our in vivo ratings and the self-report measure 
was surprisingly weak.  The strength of this relationship might have been an artifact of 
methodological differences across these two measures. For the self-report assessment, 
participants responded to hypothetical TAF situations, whereas the in vivo induction 
involved writing down and contemplating a personally relevant negative thought and 
providing ratings. Although both the in vivo and self-report measures have been 
empirically validated (Berman et al., 2011; Shafran et al., 1996, respectively), it seems as 
though these assessments are measuring different forms of TAF. The in vivo measure 
might be assessing “in the moment” or “state” TAF.  With this assessment, the negative 
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thought is very salient and individuals’ responses might differ depending on their 
experience with the negative event (i.e., having a relative die of cancer or HIV). The self-
report measure, on the other hand, might be assessing a more stable “trait-like” TAF.  
Laboring under this interpretation, we can conclude that the developmental experiences 
assessed in the current study were more predictive of trait TAF, compared to state TAF.  
An additional limitation involves participant recruitment. Although a significant 
relationship between religiosity and the moral bias was observed, we only examined 
religious group differences between Christians and Atheists/Agnostics. Consequently, the 
relationship between strength of religiosity and religious motivation was only relevant for 
individuals in these groups and we cannot draw broad conclusions about how religiosity 
or motivational orientation predicts TAF in other faiths.  Recruiting more participants 
from different religious groups and accounting for the heterogeneity that exists within the 
Christian faith (i.e., differences between Christians and Protestants) would allow for a 
more nuanced understanding of this relationship.   
Moreover, as demonstrated by power analyses, our sample size was not large 
enough to detect small effect sizes.  In order to achieve adequate power to detect small 
effect sizes, we would need 155 more participants to complete self-report measures and 
355 more participants for the in vivo paradigm.  Although recruiting this many 
participants is not feasible for the current study, future researchers should strive to 
include this critical number of participants in order to identify pathways with small effect 
sizes.    
Other limitations of the study involve the methodology and accuracy of the self-
report measures, specifically the measure of childhood trauma.  Although, the majority of 
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research on childhood trauma tends to involve adult retrospective report, this type of 
methodology has been associated with recall bias (Senn, Carey, & Vanable, 2008). By 
using this approach, the memory of the abuse might be recalled with less accuracy than 
recent events (Noll, Horowitz, Bonanno, Trickett, & Putnam, 2003). Moreover, it has 
been suggested that events following the abuse might influence subjective perceptions of 
the trauma (Senn et al., 2008). In order to avoid retrospective report, future research 
could longitudinally follow individuals whose abuse is documented and substantiated in 
childhood (Noll et al., 2003; Widom & Ames, 1994) or assess for trauma in 
childhood/adolescence (Howard & Wang, 2005) and longitudinally track these 
individuals into adulthood.  Moreover, it would benefit researchers to gather more 
information on the traumatic incident (Masten & Osofsky, 2010).  By identifying the age 
at which the abuse occurred, the victim’s relationship with the perpetrator, or cultural 
beliefs regarding the trauma, we could accurately determine whether certain 
characteristics of trauma (e.g., parent as the perpetrator) are uniquely associated with the 
development of TAF.  
More research is also needed to understand the relationship between 
psychological control and emotional abuse or neglect.  These constructs purportedly 
assess varied forms of parental or caregiver behavior.  Psychological control taps into 
parents’ attempts to control a child’s emotional and thought processes, whereas emotional 
abuse refers to instances in which the child is intentionally made to feel bad about 
him/herself or words and actions are used to humiliate the child.  Although these 
constructs differentially predicted TAF, it might be that these variables exist along a 
continuum and emotional abuse is a more severe form of psychological control.  By 
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examining this relationship through methodologically varied self-report and behavioral 
measures (coding parent-child interactions), a better understanding of their communality 
could be obtained.    
In regards to statistical limitations, the multicollinearity among study measures 
might have compromised the significance of specific indirect effects.  Preacher and 
Hayes (2008) indicated that when mediating variables are correlated, like guilt induction 
and psychological control, the effects of the mediators on the endogenous variable are 
weakened. To avoid this limitation in future research, multiple measures of a construct 
(e.g., maladaptive parenting tactics) should be used and a latent variable assessing the 
underlying construct should be created (Kline, 1991).   
Another statistical factor that might have influenced results is the smaller sample 
size for the in vivo measure.  Research has suggested that in path analyses, a smaller 
sample size (and reduced power) is preferred for the chi square test, as it more accurately 
tests the reasonable fit of the model (Bollen, 1989).  The self-report sample, on the other 
hand, was so large that the chi square test would most likely be significant, regardless of 
the model’s fit (Bollen, 1989).  Although these limitations suggest that we should 
examine other fit indices (e.g., CFI), other research states that fit indices are misleading 
and permit investigators to argue that a misspecified model (as evidenced by the chi-
square test) is not actually a poor fit (Hayduk, Cummings, Boadu, Pazderka-Robinson, & 
Boulianne, 2007).  These limitations highlight that there was no clear statistical method 
to test the fit of our comprehensive model, as each technique has its strengths and 
limitations.  
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As demonstrated by the effect of multicollinearity in path analysis, it is evident 
that the current study’s correlational design weakened the power of statistical analyses.  
Moreover, the correlational design limits conclusions of causality. Longitudinal designs 
are necessary next steps to better understand how the experiences that we examined 
contribute to TAF.  Furthermore, in future research, the comprehensive model needs to be 
refined.  The amount of variance explained in TAF by the predicted variables in our 
regression models, clearly leaves open the possibility that additional factors contribute to 
TAF.  Moreover, it is clear from our regression models that the included constructs better 
predict moral TAF (23-29%), when compared to likelihood TAF (9-14%). This 
prediction pattern indicates that the moral and likelihood bias might not possess the same 
developmental correlates and aligns with Rassin, Merkelbach, et al. (2001) and Shafran et 
al.’s (1996) findings that these cognitive biases are unique factors.  To better understand 
the development of these cognitive biases, future research should: (1) be longitudinal, (2) 
include both self-report and behavioral assessments of psychological control and guilt 
induction that can be measured repeatedly throughout the longitudinal study, (3) include 
measures of competence (e.g., grades, achievement, IQ), (4) include a biological measure 
of dysregulation (e.g., cortisol) and (5) includes measure for other well-known risk 
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Male 129 (31.69%) 
Female 278 (68.31%) 
Ethnicity 
Caucasian 290 (71.25%) 
African-American 48 (11.79%) 
Hispanic 18 (4.40%) 
Asian 34 (8.35%) 
Other 17 (4.17%) 
Religion  
Protestant 176 (43.24%) 
Catholic 89 (21.87%) 
Atheist or Agnostic 64 (15.72%) 
Hindu 8 (1.90%) 
Jewish 6 (1.40%) 
Islam 5 (1.20%) 
Buddhist 3 (.70%) 
Quaker 2 (.50%) 
Other 54 (13.27%) 
Age (years) 
Mean (SD) 19.36 (1.69) 




























Male 19 (17.80%) 
Female 88 (82.24%) 
Ethnicity 
Caucasian 85 (79.40%) 
African-American 6 (5.60%) 
Hispanic 7 (6.50%) 
Asian 2 (1.90%) 
Other 7 (6.50%) 
Religion  
Protestant 56 (52.40%) 
Catholic 29 (27.10%) 
Atheist or Agnostic 19 (17.70%) 
Other 3 (3.70%) 
Age (years) 
Mean (SD) 21.39 (1.46) 
Range 18 – 25 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for the Self-Report Sample (N = 407) 
1 Descriptive analyses include participants whose religion has not changed in the past 5 years.  
Measure M SD Range 
Religiosity (SCRFS)1    
Christians (n = 160) 29.68 7.85 10-40 
Atheists/Agnostics (n = 47) 13.91 5.59 10-33 
Total sample (N = 260) 26.27 9.69 10-40 
Motivational Orientation     
Intrinsic     
Christians (n = 160) 26.03 6.40 12-40 
Atheists/Agnostics (n = 47) 18.63 2.44 14-25 
Total sample (N = 260) 24.51 6.45 12-40 
Extrinsic – Social    
Christians (n = 160) 7.48 2.77 3-15 
Atheists/Agnostics (n = 47) 5.62 3.42 3-9 
Total sample (N = 260) 6.71 2.92 3-15 
Extrinsic – Personal    
Christians (n = 160) 10.20 2.56 3-15 
Atheists/Agnostics (n = 47) 5.62 3.41 3-13 
Total sample (N = 260) 9.21 3.24 3-15 
Guilt Induction (n = 390)    
Disparagement 10.86 7.37 6-42 
Self-Serving Elicitation 12.19 7.97 6-42 
Total 23.04 14.88 12-84 
Parental Psychological Control (n = 397)    
Youth Self-Report (PPC-YSR) 11.50 2.91 8-22 
Childhood Trauma (n = 374)    
Emotional Abuse .48 .69 0–4 
Physical Abuse .31 .54 0–3 
Sexual Abuse .16 .56 0–4 
Emotional Neglect 1.52 1.26 0–4 
Physical Neglect .29 .53 0–4 
Thought Action Fusion (n = 401)    
Moral 9.41 8.69 0-36 
Likelihood 1.98 3.52 0-18 
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Table 4 
Zero-Order Correlations in Self-Report Sample (Shaded = no change in religious strength; n = 260; Unshaded = All; n= 374 - 401) 
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; Int M = Intrinsic Motivation, Ext-S = Extrinsic Social, Ext-P = Extrinsic Personal, MGI-D = Guilt Induction-
Disparagement, MGI-SS = Guilt Induction, Self Serving, PSY-C = Psychological Control, CTQ-EA = Emotional Abuse, CTQ-PA = Physical Abuse, CTQ=SA = 
Sexual Abuse, CTQ-EN = Emotional Neglect, CTQ-PN = Physical Neglect, TAF-M = Thought Action Fusion Scale Moral, TAF-L = Thought Action Fusion 
Scale Likelihood. 
Variable Int M Ext-S Ext-P MGI-D MGI-SS PSY-C CTQ-EA CTQ-PA  CTQ-SA CTQ-EN CTQ-PN TAF-M TAF-L 
SCRFS .86*** .44** .60*** -.16** -.14* -.02 -.16* .09 -.02 -.26*** -.10 .40*** .01 
Int M - .27*** .33*** -.14* -.15* -.06 -.12* .07 .05 -.18** -.06 .38*** -.02 
Ext S - - .51*** .04 .08 .17** .01 .21*** .04 -.009 .15** .32*** .17** 
Ext-P - - - -.10 -.02 .11 -.12* .02 -.06 -.23** -.13* .31*** .15** 
MGI-D - - - - .87*** .61*** .64*** .44*** .33*** .49*** .45*** .05 .23*** 
MGI-SS - - - - - .57*** .59*** .39*** .31*** .43*** .40*** .05 .18*** 
PSY-C - - - - - - .41*** .32*** .26*** .31*** .26*** .07 .20*** 
CTQ-EA - - - - - - - .68*** .47*** .57*** .53*** .13** .28*** 
CTQ-PA - - - - - - - - .60*** .38*** .56*** .20*** .31*** 
CTQ-SA - - - - - - - - - .25** .47*** .08 .22*** 
CTQ-EN - - - - - - - - - - .61*** -.05 .12* 
CTQ-PN - - - - - - - - - - - .01 .26*** 




Paired and Independent Sample t-tests Evaluating the Severity of Each Induction 
 Mean (SD)a Mean (SD)b t-value p-value 
Sentencea – Sentenceb     
Cancer – HIV 92.29 (17.38) 92.03 (18.73) -.07 .94 
Blind – HIV 87.46 (19.61) 92.03 (18.73) -2.50 .01 
Deaf – HIV 80.12 (25.49) 92.03 (18.73) 2.74 .007 
Cancer - Blind 92.29 (17.38) 87.46 (19.61) 2.01 .04 













Descriptive statistics (M (SD)) for In Vivo TAF induction (N = 107) 
 
 
Outcome Variables                      HIV-Cancer 
                                      
Anxiety 32.65 (23.38) 
Guilt 31.61 (31.17) 
Likelihood 9.54 (18.68) 
Control .84 (3.60) 
Responsibility 15.72 (23.93) 
Moral 36.40 (34.81) 
Upsetting 92.17 (17.96) 








Correlation between TAFS and In Vivo TAF Measure (N = 107) 
 Guilt Likelihood Control Responsible Moral Upset Urge TAFS-M TAFS-L 
Anxiety .70*** .36*** .05 .55*** .49*** .26* .62*** .05 -.02 
Guilt -- .37*** .06 .56*** .76*** .24** .71*** .14 .13 
Likelihood -- -- .14 .16 .17 .07 .22 .07 .18* 
Control -- -- -- .29** -.04 .006 .004 .01 -.06 
Responsible -- -- -- -- .48*** .14 .55*** -.04 -.008 
Moral -- -- -- -- -- .12 .52*** .18* .20* 
Upset -- -- -- -- -- -- .19* .24** .04 
Urge -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .03 .02 
TAFS-M -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .25** 





Descriptive Measures for the In Vivo Sample (N = 107) 
1 Descriptive analyses include participants whose religion has not changed in the past 5 years.
Measure M SD Range 
Religiosity (SCRFS)2    
Christians (n = 62) 30.11 8.20 10-40 
Atheists/Agnostics (n = 17) 12.82 3.96 10-24 
Total sample (N = 79) 26.77 10.34 10-40 
Motivational Orientation     
Intrinsic     
Christians (n = 62) 26.64 6.44 14-38 
Atheists/Agnostics (n = 17) 18.06 2.33 14-23 
Total sample (N = 79) 25.06 6.84 14-38 
Extrinsic-Social    
Christians (n = 62) 6.63 2.39 3-12 
 Atheists/Agnostics (n = 17) 4.65 1.80 3-8 
 Total sample (N = 79) 6.22 2.37 3-12 
Extrinsic-Personal    
 Christians (n = 62) 10.13 2.80 3-15 
Atheists/Agnostics (n = 17) 5.88 3.42 3-12 
 Total sample (N = 79) 9.27 3.37 3-15 
Guilt Induction (n = 107)    
Disparagement 10.33 7.08 6-38 
Self-Serving Elicitation 11.88 7.80 6-40 
Total 22.21 14.30 12-77 
Parental Psychological Control (n = 104)    
Youth Self-Report (PPC-YSR) 11.33 2.71 8-20 
Childhood Trauma (n = 83)    
Emotional Abuse .50 .70 0-3 
Physical Abuse .26 .41 0-3 
Sexual Abuse .12 .55 0–4 
Emotional Neglect 1.51 1.15 0–4 
Physical Neglect .23 .41 0–4 
In Vivo Thought Action Fusion (n = 107)    
Moral 36.40 34.81 0–100 
Likelihood 9.55 18.69 0–100 
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Table 9 
Zero-Order Correlations for In Vivo Sample (Shaded = no change in religious strength; n = 79; Unshaded = All; n= 83 - 107) 
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; Int M = Intrinsic Motivation, Ext-S = Extrinsic Social, Ext-P = Extrinsic Personal, MGI-D = Guilt Induction-
Disparagement, MGI-SS = Guilt Induction, Self Serving, PSY-C = Psychological Control, CTQ-EA = Emotional Abuse, CTQ-PA = Physical Abuse, CTQ=SA = 
Sexual Abuse, CTQ-EN = Emotional Neglect, CTQ-PN = Physical Neglect, TAF-M = In Vivo Thought Action Fusion Moral, TAF-L = In Vivo Thought Action 
Fusion Likelihood
Variable Int M Ext-S Ext-P MGI-D MGI-SS PSY-C CTQ-EA CTQ-PA  CTQ-SA CTQ-EN CTQ-PN TAF-M TAF-L 
SCRFS .85*** .41*** .56*** -.36*** -.38*** -.06 -.31** -.01 -.07 -.22 -.23 -.07 .09 
Int M - .30** .30** -.27** -.32** -.06 -.19 .02 .08 -.03 -.12 -.13 .01 
Ext S - - .30** -.26* -.26* -.009 -.19 -.02 -.19 -.09 -.02 -.07 .09 
Ext-P - - - -.28* -.26* -.05 -.35** -.24 -.24 -.39** -.37** .09 .16 
MGI-D - - - - .84*** .52*** .57*** .44*** .39*** .53*** .54*** .03 .04 
MGI-SS - - - - - .48*** .51*** .34*** .23* .37*** .42*** .12 .09 
PSY-C - - - - - - .44*** .38*** .33*** .28** .38*** .03 -.02 
CTQ-EA - - - - - - - .58*** .41*** .70*** .57*** -.11 -.02 
CTQ-PA - - - - - - - - .24* .44*** .41*** .08 .003 
CTQ-SA - - - - - - - - - .29** .29** -.15 -.08 
CTQ-EN - - - - - - - - - - .58*** -.23* -.08 
CTQ-PN - - - - - - - - - - - -.03 -.14 




Separate Regression Analyses Predicting TAFS-Likelihood 
Model        Predictors R2 ß t p 
1a Religiosity3 .006 (.08) -.08 (.28) -.97 (1.93) .33 (.06) 
2a Intrinsic Motivation3 .001 (.00) -.04 (.02) -.47 (.14) .64 (.89) 
3a Extrinsic3 .03 (.19)   .09 (.01) 
 Extrinsic – Social  .13 (-.27) 1.48 (-1.69) .14 (.09) 
 Extrinsic – Personal  .08 (.51) .91 (3.19) .36 (.003) 
4a Psychological Control .04 .20 4.12 .000 
5a Guilt Induction .05 .21 4.27 .000 
6a Childhood Trauma .11   .000 
 Emotional Abuse  .15 1.96 .05 
 Physical Abuse  .11 1.39 .16 
 Sexual Abuse  .06 .91 .36 
 Emotional Neglect  -.13 -1.78 .07 
 Physical Neglect  .17 2.28 .02 
3 For regressions involving religion, only those (1) affiliating with either Christianity (n = 159) or 
Atheism/Agnosticism (n = 47) and (2) reported that their strength of religiosity had not changed 
in the past 5 years were included. Given the potential moderation effect of religious affiliation 
(which is explored in the comprehensive model), regressions were run separately for Christians 
and Atheists/Agnostics.  For these analyses, parameter estimates for Christians will be bolded 






Separate Regression Analyses Predicting TAFS-Moral 
 
Model        Predictors R2 ß t        p 
1b Religiosity4 .09 (.23) .29 (.48) 3.82 (3.64) .000 (.001) 
2b Intrinsic Motivation4 .10 (.13) .31 (.36) 4.04 (2.55) .000 (.01) 
3b Extrinsic4 .05 (.32)    .01 (.000) 
Extrinsic – Social  .18 (.49) 2.17 (3.38)  .03 (.002) 
Extrinsic – Personal  .08 (.12) .98 (.85)  .33 (.40) 
4b Psychological Control .006 .07 1.50     .13 
5b Guilt Induction .003 .05 .97     .32 
6b Childhood Trauma .06      .000 
Emotional Abuse  .01 .16     .87 
Physical Abuse  .30 3.77    .000 
Sexual Abuse  -.02 -.30     .76 
Emotional Neglect  -09 -1.23     .22 
Physical Neglect  -.10 -1.37     .17 
4 For regressions involving religion, only those (1) affiliating with either Christianity (n = 159) or 
Atheism/Agnosticism (n = 47) and (2) reported that their strength of religiosity had not changed 
in the past 5 years were included. Given the potential moderation effect of religious affiliation 
(which is explored in the comprehensive model), regressions were run separately for Christians 
and Atheists/Agnostics.  For these analyses, parameter estimates for Christians will be bolded 






Separate Regression Analyses Predicting In Vivo TAF-Likelihood 
 
 5 For regressions involving religion, only those (1) affiliating with either Christianity (n = 62) or 
Atheism/Agnosticism (n = 17) and (2) reported that their strength of religiosity had not changed 
in the past 5 years were included. Given the potential moderation effect of religious affiliation 
(which is explored in the comprehensive model), regressions were run separately for Christians 
and Atheists/Agnostics.  For these analyses, parameter estimates for Christians will be bolded 
and estimates for Atheists/Agnostics will be (in parentheses).   
 
 
Model        Predictors R2 ß t p 
1c Religiosity5 .02 (.00) -.12  (.003) -.97 (.01) .33 (.99) 
2c Intrinsic Motivation5 .02 (.16) -.17 (-.40) -1.30 (-1.63) .19 (.12) 
3c Extrinsic5 .02 (.15)   .59 (.35) 
Extrinsic – Social  -.12 (-.03) -.96 (-.09) .34 (.93) 
Extrinsic – Personal  .06 (.39) .46 (.39) .65 (.16) 
4c Psychological Control .001 -.03 -.26 .79 
5c Guilt Induction .005 .07 .71 .48 
6c Childhood Trauma .03   .79 
Emotional Abuse  .13 .67 .50 
Physical Abuse  .04 .30 .76 
Sexual Abuse  -.08 -.65 .52 
Emotional Neglect  -.07 -.38 .70 
Physical Neglect  -.16 1.06 .29 
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Table 13 
Separate Regression Analyses Predicting In Vivo TAF-Moral 
 
6 For regressions involving religion, only those (1) affiliating with either Christianity (n = 62) or 
Atheism/Agnosticism (n = 17) and (2) reported that their strength of religiosity had not changed 
in the past 5 years were included. Given the potential moderation effect of religious affiliation 
(which is explored in the comprehensive model), regressions were run separately for Christians 
and Atheists/Agnostics.  For these analyses, parameter estimates for Christians will be bolded 









Model        Predictors R2 ß t p 
1d Religiosity6 .001 (.02) .004 (.14) .03 (.54) .97 (.60) 
2d Intrinsic Motivation6 .008 (.02) -.09 (.15) -.70 (.59) .49 (.57) 
3d Extrinsic6 .03 (.01)   .44 (.92) 
Extrinsic – Social  .05 (-.07) .38 (-.24) .70 (.81) 
Extrinsic – Personal  .15 (.10) 1.18 (.36) .24 (.73) 
4d Psychological Control .001 .03 .32 .75 
5d Guilt Induction .007 .08 .83 .41 
6d Childhood Trauma .10   .15 
Emotional Abuse  -.05 -.26 .80 
Physical Abuse  .23 1.69 .09 
Sexual Abuse  -.12 -.96 .34 
Emotional Neglect  -.29 -1.76 .08 
Physical Neglect  .05 .32 .75 
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Figure 1 














     
  



















Test of Model Fit: 
χ2(22) = 452.83, p < .001 
CFI = .17 
RMSEA= .30 (90% CI = .27-.32), p< .001 
R2 = 14% 
















     
  



















Test of Model Fit: 
χ2(22) = 452.65, p < .001 
CFI = .21 
RMSEA = .30 (90% CI = .28 - .33), p < .001 
R2 = 23.3% 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 4. Comprehensive Model Predicting TAFS-Moral 
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Test of Model Fit: 
χ2(22) = 79.19, p < .001 
CFI = .38 
RMSEA = .22 (90% CI = .17 - .27), p < .001 
R2 = 9%  
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 












Figure 5. Comprehensive Model Predicting In Vivo TAF-Likelihood 
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Test of Model Fit: 
χ2(22) = 84.40, p < .001 
CFI = .41 
RMSEA = .23 (90% CI = .17 - .28), p < .001 
R2 = 29% 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 












Figure 6. Comprehensive Model Predicting In Vivo TAF-Moral 
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Appendix A 
Additional Exploratory Analyses   
Inclusion of all participants. To determine how the comprehensive model was 
affected by excluding participants whose religiosity had changed over the past 5 years, 
the following analyses examined how: (1) goodness of fit indices, (2) significance of 
direct or indirect effects, and (3) magnitude or direction of pathway coefficients, changed 
when all participants were included.  In the following analysis, participants who affiliated 
with Christianity or Atheism/Agnosticism and completed all study questionnaires (N = 
336) were included.  
TAFS. Results indicated a poor fit for TAFS-Likelihood (χ2(22) = 659.74, p < 
.001; CFI = .18; RMSEA = .29; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.27 - 0.31) with 14% of variance 
accounted for by the predictors.  However, for the Mediator Model, religiosity 
significantly predicted psychological control (β = .44, SE = .06, p < .001), guilt induction 
(β = .10, SE = .02, p < .001), and intrinsic motivation (β = .25, SE = .04, p < .001) and 
for the Dependent Variable Model, psychological control (β = .21, SE = .07, p < .01) and 
emotional neglect (β = -.17, SE = .07, p < .05) significantly predicted TAFS-Likelihood. 
No indirect effects were found for TAFS-Likelihood. 
For TAFS-Moral, results similarly indicated a misfit model (χ2(22) = 659.07, p < 
.001; CFI = .23; RMSEA = .29; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.27 - 0.32) with 23% of variance (p 
< .001) accounted for by the predictors.  In addition to the results described above for the 
Mediator Model, for the Dependent Variable Model, intrinsic motivation (β = .33, SE = 
.08, p < .001) and physical abuse (β = .15, SE = .07, p < .05) significantly predicted 
TAFS-Moral.  Additionally, a significant total (c’ = .22, SE = .09, p < .05) effect was 
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found. The indirect effect of religiosity on TAF-Moral was also found to be significant 
for Christians (abtotal_Christians = .11, 95% BCI = .00 - .22, SE = .04, p < .01) and for this 
religious group the only significant mediator was intrinsic motivation (abintrin_Christians = 
.08, 95% BCI = .01- .13, SE = .02, p < .001).  Specifically, the relationship between 
strength of religiosity and TAFS-Moral was mediated by intrinsic motivation, but this 
mediational effect was conditional upon affiliation with Christianity. 
In vivo ratings.  A path analysis testing the comprehensive model was conducted 
with Christian or Atheist/Agnostic participants who completed all questionnaires and 
participated in the in vivo paradigm (N = 77).  Results indicated a poor fit for in vivo 
TAF-Moral (χ2(22) = 150.15, p < .001; CFI = .27; RMSEA = .27; 90% CI RMSEA = 
0.23 - 0.32) with 26% of variance accounted for by the predictors (p < .05). For the 
Mediator Model, strength of religiosity predicted psychological control (β = .62, SE = 
.11, p < .001), guilt induction (β = .15, SE = .04, p < .01), and intrinsic motivation (β = 
.34, SE = .09, p < .001).  For the Dependent Variable Model, no indicators significantly 
predicted in vivo ratings of TAF-Moral.  Moreover, no direct, indirect, or moderation 
effects were observed.  
A similarly poor fit was obtained for in vivo TAF-Likelihood (χ2(22) = 146.17, p 
< .001; CFI = .24; RMSEA = .27; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.23 - 0.31) with 11% of the 
variance accounted for by the predictors (p > .05). Beyond those identified in the 
Mediator Model above, no indicators significantly predicted in vivo ratings of TAF-
Likelihood. Therefore, no significant mediation or moderation effects were detected in 
the prediction of in vivo TAF-Likelihood. 
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Summary. Comparing the goodness of fit indices for the current models to those 
obtained when testing hypothesis 5, it can be seen that excluding participants based on 
changes in religiosity does not impact the fit of the model for either TAF bias, nor does it 
affect the amount of variance explained in the respective dependent variables.  Moreover, 
the same direct, indirect, and moderation effects were observed.   
Extrinsic motivation as a mediating variable. 
TAFS. In the testing of hypothesis 3, the social subscale of extrinsic motivation 
was unexpectedly found to significantly predict TAFS-Moral (Table 11; Model 3b).  
Therefore, a path analysis was conducted to examine whether this subscale mediated the 
relationship between strength of religiosity and TAFS-Moral in Christians. Results 
indicated that no significant indirect effect was found.  Therefore, the social subscale of 
extrinsic motivation does not mediate the relationship between strength of religiosity and 
TAFS-Moral.  
In vivo ratings.  Given that neither the social or personal subscale of extrinsic 
motivation was found to significantly predict in vivo ratings of TAF-Moral or TAF-
Likelihood, no mediation analyses were conducted to examine whether extrinsic 
motivation mediated the relationship between strength of religiosity and in vivo TAF 
ratings.  
Summary.   Although the social subscale of extrinsic motivation was significantly 
related to strength of religiosity and uniquely predicted TAFS-Moral scores, extrinsic 
motivation was not found to mediate the relationship between strength of religiosity and 
TAFS-Moral.  
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Parenting strategies as a mediator.  After a trauma, research has demonstrated 
that the parent-child relationship can influence the child’s development of 
psychopathology (Alink, et al., 2009) and correlational analyses demonstrated positive 
associations between parenting strategies (i.e., psychological control and guilt induction), 
childhood trauma, and TAFS (Tables 4, 10, and 11), additional analyses explored 
mediation pathways.  More specifically, path analyses tested whether psychological 
control (M1) or guilt induction (M2) mediated the relationship between the five different 
types of childhood trauma - emotional abuse (X1), physical abuse (X2), sexual abuse (X3), 
emotional neglect (X4), and physical neglect (X5) – and TAF-Moral (Y1) or TAF-
Likelihood (Y2).  It is important to note that participants who reported that their religiosity 
changed in the past 5 years were not excluded from the following analyses since the 
variables of interest are not related to developmental experiences with religion. 
TAFS. For the Mediator Models, emotional abuse predicted psychological control 
(β = .29, SE = .07, p < .001) and guilt induction (β = .50, SE = .06, p < .001).  Emotional 
neglect similarly predicted both psychological control (β = .21, SE = .07, p < .01) and 
guilt induction (β = .18, SE = .06, p < .01). For the Dependent Variable Models, 
emotional neglect (β = -.18, SE = .07, p < .01), physical neglect (β = .20, SE = .07, p < 
.001), and psychological control (β = .17, SE = .06, p < .01) significantly predicted 
TAFS-Likelihood, while only physical abuse (β = .28, SE = .08, p < .001) significantly 
predicted TAFS-Moral.  
Next, the indirect, direct, and total effects were examined.  For TAFS-Likelihood, 
significant direct effects were found for emotional neglect (c’EA = -.19, SE = .07, p < .01) 
and physical neglect (c’PN = .20, SE = .06, p < .01). Moreover, significant total effects 
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were found for emotional abuse (cEA = .16, SE = .08, p < .05), emotional neglect (cEN = -
.15, SE = .07, p < .05), and physical neglect (cPN = .19, SE = .07, p < .01).  The indirect 
effect of emotional neglect on TAF-Likelihood was significant (abEN = .04, 95% BCI = 
.01 - .07, SE = .01, p < .05), with psychological control emerging as the only significant 
mediator (abEN_Psyc = .04, 95% BCI = .01 - .07, SE = .01, p < .05).  Psychological control 
was similarly found to mediate the relationship between emotional abuse and TAFS-
Likelihood (abEA_Psyc = .05, 95% BCI = .00 - .08, SE = .02, p < .05).  For TAFS-Moral, 
no indirect effects were found.  However, both a significant total effect (cPA = .28, SE = 
.08, p < .001) and a direct effect (c’PA = .27, SE = .08, p < .001) were found for physical 
abuse.   
In vivo ratings.  For the Mediator Models, only sexual abuse was found to predict 
psychological control (β = .21, SE = .11, p < .05). No other types of childhood trauma 
predicted psychological control or guilt induction.  For the Dependent Variable Model, 
only emotional neglect significantly predicted in vivo TAF-Moral (β = -.34, SE = .15, p < 
.05).  No significant predictors were found for in vivo TAF-Likelihood.   Moreover, no 
indirect or total effects were found for in vivo ratings of TAF-Moral or TAF-Likelihood. 
Summary. Path analyses indicated that, in the self-report sample, both emotional 
abuse and neglect significantly predicted psychological control and guilt induction and in 
the in vivo sample, sexual abuse significantly predicted psychological control.  For TAF-
Likelihood, emotional and physical neglect, as well as psychological control significantly 
predicted TAFS-Likelihood.  Additionally, psychological control was found to 
significantly mediate the relationship between (1) emotional abuse and TAFS-Likelihood, 
as well as (2) emotional neglect and TAFS-Likelihood. These relationships were not 
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replicated with the in vivo rating of TAF-Likelihood; rather, no significant direct or 
indirect relationships were observed with this DV.  For TAF-Moral, physical abuse 
significantly predicted TAFS-Moral and emotional neglect significantly predicted in vivo 
ratings of TAF-Moral.  No other relationships were observed with TAF-Moral.  
Specificity of predictors to TAF.  To determine the specificity of our variables 
in the prediction of TAF, the comprehensive model was tested with the DASS-Anxiety 
subscale, DASS-Depression subscale, and DOCS-Total score (OCD symptom severity) 
substituting TAF as the outcome variable.   
TAFS.  Akin to the comprehensive model, religiosity significantly predicted 
psychological control (β = .46, SE = .08, p < .001), guilt induction (β = .11, SE = .02, p < 
.01), and intrinsic motivation (β = .26, SE = .06, p < .01).  With DASS-Anxiety as the 
outcome variable, results indicated that the model was poorly fit (χ2(22) = 441.94, p < 
.001; CFI = .19; RMSEA = .30; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.28 - 0.33) and accounted for 19% 
of the variance in the DV (p < .001). Moreover, no direct or indirect effects were found in 
the prediction of DASS-Anxiety.  With DASS-Depression as the outcome variable, 
results indicated that the model was poorly fit (χ2(22) = 443.97, p < .001; CFI = .18; 
RMSEA = .30; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.28 - 0.33) and accounted for 15% of the variance in 
the DV (p < .01). No direct or indirect effects were found.  Finally, with the DOCS total 
score as the outcome variable, results again indicated that the model was poorly fit 
(χ2(22) = 427.22, p < .001; CFI = .20; RMSEA = .30; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.27 - 0.32) and 
accounted for 17% in the DV (p < .01). Similar to the other symptom severity measures, 
no direct or indirect effects were found in the prediction of DOCS total scores.  
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In vivo ratings. Similar to the comprehensive model, religiosity significantly 
predicted psychological control (β = .56, SE = .13, p < .001), guilt induction (β = .11, SE 
= .03, p < .01), and intrinsic motivation (β = .28, SE = .09, p < .01).  With DASS-
Anxiety as the outcome variable, results indicated that the model was poorly fit (χ2(22) = 
84.41, p < .001; CFI = .40; RMSEA = .22; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.17 - 0.28) and accounted 
for 26% of the variance in the DV (p < .05). Moreover, no direct or indirect effects were 
found in the prediction of DASS-Anxiety.  With DASS-Depression as the outcome 
variable, results indicated that the model was poorly fit (χ2(22) = 84.40, p < .001; CFI = 
.42; RMSEA = .23; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.18 - 0.28) and accounted for 28% of the 
variance in the DV (p < .05). No direct or indirect effects were found.  Finally, with 
DOCS total score as the outcome variable, results indicated that the model was poorly fit 
(χ2(22) = 84.40, p < .001; CFI = .41; RMSEA = .22; 90% CI RMSEA = 0.17 - 0.28) and 
accounted for 19% in the DV (p < .05). Similar to the other symptom severity measures, 
no direct or indirect effects were found in the prediction of DOCS total scores.   
Summary. As demonstrated by these analyses, the significant direct and indirect 
effects found for TAF-Likelihood and TAF–Moral were specific to these cognitive bias, 
and were not found with other measures of psychological distress or symptom severity.  
Moreover, of all the dependent variables, the study’s predictors accounted for more 
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